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REVIEW OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION AND THE TRANSIT COMMISSION
IN THE NEW YORK COURTS'
I.
GENERAL JURISDICTION AND POWERS.
T

HE Public 'Service Commissions 2 were first created in
New York in 1907, and succeeded to the powers and duties
of several utility regulating bodies,-the board of railroad
commissioners, 3 the commission of gas and electricity, 4 the
inspector of gas meters,5 and the board of rapid transit railroad commissioners. 6 There was one commission for each
district, the first district comprising greater New York City,
and the second district including the rest of the state. The
statute creating these commissions was held constitutional7
This geographical arrangement was changed in 1921.
The transportation situation in New York City was placed
under the control of the newly-created Transit Commission.
'This paper was written as a thesis for the course in Administrative Law
conducted at the Harvard Law School by Professor Felix Frankfurter. Its
purpose was to examine the judicial review, in the New York courts, of the
orders and acts of the Public Service Commission and the Transit Commission.
For this reason, no decisions are considered except such as involve an adjudication, direct or collateral, upon some determination of the Commission. This
eliminates the cases which raise the question as to whether matters which were
not submitted to the Commission should have been so submitted, e. g., the many
recent decisions in regard to bus lines operating without the required certificate
of convenience and necessity. And because this is a study of review in the state
courts, all federal cases are omitted. With these exceptions, I have tried to
consider all the pertinent authorities (excluding memorandum opinions) fotmd
in the reports up to 249 N. Y. 178 and 230 N. Y. Supp. 792.
_All references to statute, unless otherwise noted, are to the Public Service
Commissions Law (Laws of 1907, c. 429, amended and revised as Laws of
1910, c. 48; Consol. Laws, c. 48).
' Sec. 120. See In re Buffalo Frontier Terminal R. R. Co., 131 App. Div.
503, 115 N. Y. Supp. 483 (4th Dept. 1909); People ex rel. Town of West
Seneca v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 130 App. Div. 335, 144 N. Y. Supp. 636 (3rd Dept.
1909) ; appeal dismissed, 195 N. Y. 562, 88 N. E. 1128 (1909).
"Sec. 121.
6 Sec. 122. See People ex rel. Rehm v. Willcox, 60 Misc. 329, 112 N. Y.
Supp. 341 (Queens County, 1908).
'Sec. 123.
'Gubner v. McClellan, 130 App. Div. 716, 115 N. Y. Supp. 755 (1st
Dept. 1909).
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All other matters previously regulated by the Commissions
of each district were now placed under the control of a single
Public Service Commission, which had jurisdiction over both
districts. 8 This statute has also been held constitutional. 9
In 1926, the state departments were reorganized, the Transit
Commission becoming the Metropolitan Division, and the
Public Service Commission becoming the State Division of
the Department of Public Service. 10
In examining the activities of the Commission, we find
first that it has been given some powers of a legislative
nature. Its exercise of these powers is not subject to review
by the courts, except as to constitutionality. Thus the Rapid
Transit Act 11 gave to the Commission the power to determine when and where it is necessary to construct rapid
transit railroads in New York City. Before undertaking
such construction, the Commission must secure the consent
of the owners of half of the adjoining property, or in lieu
thereof, have the necessity for the railroad assented to by
three commissioners appointed by the court. The object of
this requirement is to prevent the Public Service Commission
(which acts here as an agent of the Legislature rather than
as an administrative board) from thrusting a railroad among
property owners against their consent. Such an impairment
of property rights requires a judicial determination, which is
effected by this special commission as an agent of the court
(like the appraisal commissioners in eminent domain proceedings, discussed
below), whose decision must be confirmed
12
by the court.
Once the necessity for the railroad has been thus established, the Public Service Commission is authorized to acquire by eminent domain whatever land is needed for that
purpose.' 3 Its fiat as to what land shall be taken cannot be
'Laws of 1921, c. 134. It was provided that there should be a transit
commission for cities containing a population of more than 1,000,000; New York
City was, of course, the only one to which this description was applicable.
* Matter of McAneny v. Board of Estimate, 232 N. Y. 377, 134 N. E.
187 (1922).
" Laws of 1926, c. 350, Secs. 431-3.
Originally Laws of 1891, c. 4, amended several times.
" Sec. 4 of the Rapid Transit Act. For a decision on such a determination
of commissioners appointed in lieu of consent, see in re Pub. Serv. Comm., 154
App. Div. 587, 139 N. Y. Supp. 982 (1st Dept. 1913).
33Rapid Transit Act, Sec. 39.
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interfered with by the courts, even though bad faith on the
Commission's part is charged,-as long as its petition shows
that the land is desired for a public purpose. 4
The compensation to be paid to owners, whose land is
thus taken by order of the Public Service Commission, is
fixed by appraisal commissioners appointed by the court.
The decree of these commissioners, like the decisions of the

special commissioners for consent hereinbefore described, are
in all cases subject to review by the courts.' 5 Miscellaneous
cases as to the procedure before these appraisal commissioners and the principles of damages by which they are to be
guided are collected in the footnote.' 6
Another legislative function which is delegated to the

Commission by the Rapid Transit Act is the power, with the
approval and consent of the Board of Estimate and Apportionment, to contract on behalf of the City of New York for

the construction of rapid transit routes.' 7 The city will be
liable for work done under these contracts,'

provided that

they have a legitimate connection with such construction,

9

and provided, further, that all the details which involve the

expenditure of money have been approved by the Board of
Estimate; 20 but the city is not liable for any negligence on
the part of the Commission by which the other contracting
party is prejudiced. 21 The courts, regardless of how they
may feel about these contracts, cannot set them aside, for the
"Matter of Pub. Serv. Comm., 217 N. Y. 61, 111 N. E. 658 (1916), writ
of error dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 251 U. S. 537 (1919).
In re Willcox, in re Manhattan Loop No. 1, 135 N. Y. Supp. 153 (Sup.
Ct., New York County, 1912).
" In re Willcox, 142 App. Div. 680, 127 N. Y. Supp. 777 (1st Dept. 1911);
Matter of Willcox (4th Ave. Subway), 213 N. Y. 218, 107 N. E. 499 (1914);
in re Willcox, in re Flatbush Ave. Extension, 165 App. Div. 197, 151 N. Y.
Supp. 141 (2nd Dept. 1914) ; in re Pub. Serv. Comm., in re East 42nd St., 92
Misc. 420, 155 N. Y. Supp. 985 (New York County, 1915); Matter of
Pub. Serv. Comm., 217 N. Y. 183, 111 N. E. 756 (1916); Matter of Pub. Serv.
Comm. (Montague St.), 224 N. Y. 211, 120 N. E. 147 (1918).
' Rapid Transit Act, Secs. 4, 5, and 27. See Amendment in Laws of 1912,
c. 226.
' Degnon Contracting Co. v. City of New York, 235 N. Y. 481, 139 N. E.
580 (1923).
19 Matter of Continental Guaranty Corp. v. Craig, 240 N. Y. 354, 148 N. E.
548 (1925).
' See Union Real Estate Co. v. City of New York, 183 App. Div. 417, 170
N. Y. Supp. 784 (1st Dept. 1918).
See O'Brien v. City of New York, 182 App. Div. 810, 170 N. Y. Supp.
592 (1st Dept. 1918).
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acts of the Commission and of the Board of Estimate in this
unless they violate the state
connection are not reviewable,
22
or federal Constitution.
The Conservation Law 23 also invests the Commission

with a quasi-legislative function. Under the terms of that
statute,24 a corporation producing light, heat, or power may
bring an action to condemn real property on the basis of a
determination by the Commission

25

that such property is

an integral component of a single undeveloped water power
site,26 of which the petitioning corporation owns the major
part. If the Commission determines that the acquisition of
such real property by some such corporation is necessary for
the production of heat, light, or power which is required for
public use, that is a judgment on a legislative question which
will not be reviewed by the courts; the judiciary will inquire
only as to whether the use
by this particular petitioner will
2
constitute a public useY.

There is one feature of the Commission's work which
cannot properly be called legislative, but in which it acts as
an investigating committee for the Legislature. This is the
duty imposed upon the Transit Commission, after making the
necessary studies and investigation of the situation, to prepare a plan of readjustment for the relief of the emergency
conditions which existed in 28New York City, and for the
improvement of local transit.
The bulk of the Commission's work, however, is in the
regulation of public utilities. In this administrative field,
its orders and acts are subject to review by the courts. The
'-Admiral Realty Co. v. City of New York, 206 N. Y. 110, 99 N. E. 241
(1912) ; Hopper v. Willcox, 155 App. Div. 213, 140 N. Y. Supp. 277 (1st Dept.
1913), leave to appeal denied, 155 App. Div. 224, 140 N. Y. Supp. 423.
Laws of 1911, c. 647 (Consol. Laws, c. 65).
"'Sec.624 (3) added by Laws of 1921, c. 579, and amended by Laws of
1922, c. 242. This statute was held constitutional in People ex rel. Horton v.
Prendergast, 248 N. Y. 215, 162 N. E. 10 (1928).
'Matter of Niagara, Lockport and Ontario Power Co., 125 Misc. 269, 210
N. Y. Supp. 748 (Oswego County, 1925).
' If the site were not a single one, Section 624 (2) of the Conservation
Law would apply, so that the Water Power Commission would have authority
to act and the Public Service Commission would have no jurisdiction. See
People ex rel. Horton v. Prendergast, supra, Note 24, at 220-222.
People ex rel. Horton v. Prendergast, supra, Note 24 at 222-224; Matter
of Niagara, Lockport and Ontario Power Co., supra, Note 25 at 276-8.
'Art. VI added by Laws of 1921, c. 134, See. 69, Matter of Gilchrist, 130
Misc. 456, 224 N. Y. Supp. 210 (New York County, 1927).
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Commission was given powers of regulation over railroads,
street railroads, and common carriers, 29 including (since
1909) bus lines; 30 over gas and electric corporations; 31 over
steam corporations (since 1913) ; 32 and over telegraph and
telephone lines and corporations (since 1910). 33 This affords a wide ambit of activities, and it has not been difficult
to decide what utilities are subject to the Commission's supervision. The court has had occasion in three instances to rule
that certain businesses somewhat "affected with a public
interest" do not fall within this sphere of regulation. They
were: (a) a leased parcel room in a railroad passenger terminal; 34 (b) an elevator operated on private property for
the residents on that property; -3 and (c) subways which
carry the electrical conductors and wires of electric light
companies.3 6
Of course the Commission has jurisdiction only over a
utility operating in New York state. But it is not precluded
by the commerce clause of the federal Constitution from
regulating the rates charged to retail consumers in New
York by a gas company which produces its gas in another
state and then brings it into New York.31 As to matters
within the state, but subject to the concurrent jurisdiction
of Congress under the commerce clause, the Commission has
power to act in the absence of regulation by Congress. Thus,
under the Transportation Act of 1920, the Commission was
at liberty to regulate interstate railroad rates after September 1, 1920, until the Interstate Commerce Commission

' Arts. II and III, Secs. 25-59.
Transportation Corporations Law, Laws of 1909, c. 219 (Consol. Laws,
c. 63), Secs. 24-26, changed by Laws of 1926, c. 762, Sec. 1, to be Secs. 64-66.
31
Art. IV, Secs. 64-67.
" Art IV-a., Secs. 78-89 added by Laws of 1913, c. 505.
'Art V, Secs. 90-103 added by Laws of 1910, c. 673.
' Matter of Pub. Serv. Comm. (Matter of Mendel), 214 N. Y. 46, 108
N. E. 94 (1915).
People ex rel. Kelly v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 171 App. Div. 810, 157 N. Y.
Supp. 703 (3rd Dept. 1916).
" City of New York v. Prendergast, 202 App. Div. 308, 195 N. Y. Supp.
815 (1st Dept. 1922).
"; Matter of Pennsylvania Gas. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 225 N. Y. 397,
122 N. E. 260 (1919), aff'd 252 U. S. 23, 40 Sup. Ct. 279 (1920).
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should take action.3 8 But as soon as the Interstate Commerce Commission does or is authorized to "enter the field,"
the Public Service Commission is ousted of jurisdiction.3 9
Not only must the Commission keep from interfering in
subjects which the national government has taken in hand,
but it must not infringe too closely on local municipal control. Where the municipality has the power to regulate certain matters, and has exercised that power, the Commission
is precluded from taking any action. 40 But where these matters are within the orbit of regulation by the Commission,
and it has ruled adversely on the municipality's petition for
some action, the municipality cannot then try to effect the
desired result by ordinance, 4 1-such an edict is altogether
42
void.
II.

PROCEDURE.
A.

Administrative Technique.

The Commission is given great leeway in the conduct of
proceedings before it. Most of the hearings provided for by
the various sections may be instituted by the Commission on
' Pub. Serv. Comm. v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 230 N. Y. 149, 129 N. E.
455 (1920). The Interstate Commerce Commission subsequently entered this
field; this ended the jurisdiction of the Pub. Serv. Comm. New York v. United
States, 257 U. S. 591, 42 Sup. Ct. 239 (1922).
" People ex rel. N. Y. Central R. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 233 N. Y.
113, 135 N. E. 195 (1922); People ex rel. N. Y. Central R. R. Co. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm., 198 App. Div. 436, 191 N. Y. Supp. 636 (3rd Dept. 1921), aff'd
without opinion, 232 N. Y. 606, 134 N. E. 590 (1922), certiorari denied, 258
U. S. 620 (1922); Whish v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 205 App. Div. 756, 200 N. Y.
Supp. 282 (3rd Dept. 1923), aff'd on opinion below, 240 N. Y. 677, 148 N. E.
755 (1925). With the Whish case, compare People ex rel. Municipal Gas Co.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm., infra, Chapter III, Section A.
" People ex rel. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. Co. v. Willcox,
200 N. Y. 423, 94 N. E. 212 (1911); People ex rel. United Traction Co. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm., 167 App. Div. 498, 153 N. Y. S. 542 (3rd Dept. 1915).
"City of Troy v. United Traction Co., 202 N. Y. 333, 95 N. E. 759 (1911);
Village of Elmira Heights v. Erie R. R. Co., 125 Misc. 586, 211 N. Y. Supp.
893 (Chemung County, 1925), affd without opinion, 214 App. Div. 641, 213
N. Y. Supp. 929 (3rd Dept. 1926).
, Therefore the company has a complete defense at law, and is not entitled
to an injunction. Erie R. R. Co. v. Village of Elmira Heights, 125 Misc. 441,
211 N. Y. Supp. 688 (Chemung County, 1925).
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its own motion as well as upon complaint, and the Commission can issue orders based thereon. 1 But Sec. 48 of the
statute, which applies to common carriers, makes a distinction between investigations in response to complaints and
investigations initiated by the Commission itself. Under this
section, the Commission has power to investigate as to any
acts done or omitted to be done by a common carrier 2 in
violation of law or of the Commission's order.
If this inquiry is made upon complaint, the Commission may issue an order directing the utility to remedy the
matter. This section allows the Commission only to issue
orders; if it wishes to enforce the orders, it must bring summary proceedings under Sec. 57, as described below,-the
object of the investigation under Sec. 48 being merely to discover the facts on the basis of which to proceed under
Sec. 57.3 Such an order can be enforced only by the Commission and in the manner described, it cannot be enforced
by the complainant.4 On the other hand, if the Commission
starts the investigation under Sec. 48 on its own motion,
then it hasn't even power to issue an order, but must simply
ascertain the facts and then proceed under Sec. 57,-any
5
order which is made is absolutely void.
In hearings before it, the Commission is not bound by
the ordinary rules of evidence, 6 except that it must give the
1 Secs. 49-51a in regard to common carriers, and Secs. 97 and 98, in regard
to telegraph and telephone lines are typical. Until 1921, the Commission could
not proceed on its own motion under Sec. 72 or under Sec. 85 (these sections
are discussed in the chapter on rate regulation, the former applying to gas or
electric corporations and the latter to steam corporations). But the Commission could still start investigations on its own motion in regard to rates by
virtue of the provisions of Sec. 66 (5) and Sec. 80 (4), respectively. The
Commission was given this power to proceed on its own motion, as to Sec. 72
by Laws of 1921, c. 134, Sec. 49; as to Sec. 85 by ibid. Sec. 62.
- Sec. 96 is the corresponding provision in regard to telephone companies.
There are no similar sections in the case of the other utilities, investigations as
to then can be had only in connection with the Commission's regulation of
specific phases of their activity.
' See Willcox v. Richmond Light & R. R. Co., 142 App. Div. 44, 128 N. Y.
Supp. 266, 268 (2nd Dept., 1910).
' Murphy v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 225 N. Y. 548, 122 N. E. 700 (1919).
Cf. Note 19, infra.
'People v. Monarch, 193 App. Div. 707, 185 N. Y. Supp. 5 (2nd Dept. 1920),
leave to appeal denied, 185 N. Y. S. 947 (1920).
'Sec. 20. See City of New York v. Nixon, 111 Misc. 224, 183 N. Y. Supp.
6 (New York County, 1920).
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parties an opportunity to rebut all the important evidence. 7
Nor is the Commission required to join as a party anyone
other than the complainant and the person complained of,8
though it may in its discretion allow other interested parties
to intervene. 9 The statute in some cases allows persons who
could not be parties in an equity action to be parties before
the Commission.' 0 The granting or refusal of an application
for re-hearing rests entirely within the discretion of the Commission," though in some cases the courts will remit the
matter for a re-hearing before review, if that is found adthe Commission may re-open a case on its
visable.' 2 And
13
own motion.
The Commission is given power to subpcena witnesses
and papers, and any witnesses who refuses to answer4 or to
produce the papers may be committed for contempt.'
'People ex rel. Judge v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 192 App. Div. 837, 183 N. Y.
283 (3rd Dept. 1920). & Hudson Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 140 App.
Supp.'People
ex reL. Delaware
Div. 839, 125 N. Y. Supp. 1000 (3rd Dept. 1910).
'People ex re. New York Central & Hudson River R. R. .Co. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm., 195 N. Y. 157, 88 N. E. 261 (1909) ; People ex reL. N. Y. Edison
Co. v. Willcox, 207 N. Y. 86, 100 N. E. 705 (1912) ; People ex reL. New York
Central & Hudson River R. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 227 N. Y. 248, 125
N. E. 438 (1919) ; re-argument denied, 228 N. Y. 553, 126 N. E. 728 (1920) ;
People ex reL. N. Y. Central R. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 193 App. Div. 322,
183 N. Y. Supp. 930 (3rd Dept. 1920).
11Sec. 71 in regard to gas and electric corporations, Sec. 84 in regard to
steam corporations. See City of Oswego v. People's Gas & Elec. Co., 116
Misc. 354, 190 N. Y. Supp. 39, 42 (Oswego County, 1921). See also Jamaica
Gaslight Co. v. Nixon, 110 Misc. 494, 181 N. Y. Supp. 620 (New York
County, 1920).
Sec. 22; People ex reL. New York & Queens Gas. Co. v. Straus, 182
App. Div. 666, 169 N. Y. Supp. 953 (1st Dept. 1918).
"In re Buffalo Frontier Terminal R. R. Co., 131 App. Div. 503, 115 N. Y.
Supp. 483 (4th Dept. 1909) ; People ex rel. United Traction Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm., 167 App. Div. 498, 153 N. Y. Supp. 542 (App. Div. 3rd Dept. 1915);
People ex reL. Bath & Hammondsport R. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 194 N.
Y. 543, 87 N. E. 1125 (1909). Cf. People ex reL. New York, New Haven &
Hartford R. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 159 App. Div. 531, 145 N. Y. Supp.
503 (3rd Dept. 1914), aff'd on opinion below, 215 N. Y. 689, 109 N. E. 1089
(1915).
"In the case of gas and electric corporations and steam corporations, this
applies to determinations fixing rates. Secs. 72, 85; City of New York v. Pub.
Serv. Comm., 104 Misc. 306, 171 N. Y. Supp. 830 (New York County, 1918),
aff'd without opinion, 184 App. Div. 892, 172 N. Y. Supp. 912 (1st Dept. 1918).
In the case of carriers, this applies to decisions on grade crossings. People
ex reL. Town of West Seneca v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 130 App. Div. 335, 114
N. Y. Supp. 636 (3rd Dept. 1909), appeal dismissed, 195 N. Y. 562, 88 N. E.
1128 (1909).
14 Sec. 19 (2) ; Matter of Gilchrist (2 cases), 130 Misc. 456 and 491, 224 N.
Y. Supp. 210 and 249 (New York County, 1927); Matter of McAneny, 215
App. Div. 797, 213 N. Y. Supp. 848 (1st Dept. 1926).
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B.

JudicialReview.

In a few cases the Commission was in the courts in a

private capacity or as agent of the city of New York.

Thus,

unsuccessful attempts were made to interfere with the Com-

mission's disposition of certain contracts (these involved
matters of private law)."5 The Commission as an employer
is subject to the Workmen's Compensation Law. 6 And if
the terms of a contract made by the Commission for the city
of New York require the Commission's voucher as a condition
precedent for payment, one who performs under such a con-

tract may by mandamus compel the Commission to issue the
voucher.17

The most numerous and most important cases, however,
are those which review some administrative act of the Commission.

The Commission may bring summary proceedings, mandamus, or injunction to compel obedience to law or to its
mandates.'
And an individual for whose benefit an order
is made may bring mandamus or injunction to enforce the

order. 19 Obviously his claim is limited to the right given to

him by the order.2 0 These summary remedies are not granted

if the failure to obey is not serious 21; nor if the utility puts
forward a claim of impossibility or confiscation, for it is

entitled to a hearing on such an issue. 22 But in a mandamus
Heim v. McCall, 165 App. Div. 449, 150 N. Y. Supp. 933 (1st Dept.
1914), aff'd in memorandum, 214 N. Y. 629, 108 N. E. 1106 (1915), aff'd, 239
U. S. 175, 36 Sup. Ct. 78 (1915) ; Buckley Engineering Co. v. McCall, 83 Misc.
603, 145 N. Y. Supp. 525 (New York County, 1914).
"0Sexton v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 180 App. Div. 111, 167 N. Y. Supp. 493
(3rd Dept. 1917).
'People ex rel. Cranford Co. v. Willcox, 153 App. Div. 759, 138 N. Y.
Supp. 1055 (1st Dept. 1912), modified and affirmed, 207 N. Y. 743, 101 N. E.
1118 (1913).
18Sec. 57, Sec. 74, Sec. 87, Sec. 103.
" Burke v. Iroquois Natural Gas Co., 189 App. Div. 545, 179 N. Y. Supp.
230 (4th Dept. 1919), aff'd without opinion, 229 N. Y. 593, 129 N. E. 921
(1920); City of New York v. Brooklyn Edison Co., 189 N. Y. Supp. 312
(Sup. Ct. Kings County, 1921). This of course applies only to orders made
by the Commission as a result of investigation of a particular subject, and not
as a result of a general investigation under Secs. 48 or 96 (discussed above).
'lIn re Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 169 App. Div. 382, 154 N. Y. Supp.
997 (3rd Dept. 1915).
'Matter of Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 219
N. Y. 355, 114 N. E. 387 (1916).
'Pub. Serv. Comm. v. International Ry. Co., 224 N. Y. 631, 120 N. E.
727 (1918).

REVIEW OF THE P. S. COMMISSION

suit, the utility cannot re-open the question of the merits.
The court will look only to see whether a compliance of reasonable promptness is indicated; if conditions have changed,
the utility should go before the Commission and ask for a
23
re-hearing.
The Commission may also bring an action for penalties
for violation of its orders against the utility and any of its
officers or agents. 24 This procedure was held constitutional,
in view of Sec. 24 which provides that the penalties shall be
remitted if during the period of violation the utility is in
good faith pursuing an action to set aside the Commission's
order. 25 This penalty provision is construed like all penal
statutes, therefore an officer will not be liable if he can show
that he did not know of, or reasonably misunderstood the
order 26; or that he has made every effort to comply, but is
prevented from doing so by circumstances beyond his control.2 7 Similarly, if the Commission has a bus line enjoined
from operating, a driver of the bus will not be committed for
28
contempt.
Now we come to consider actions brought against the
Commission. Prohibition or injunction will lie to restrain the
Commission from acting beyond the limits of its jurisdiction.2 9 But if the Commission has jurisdiction over the general subject-matter, and the contention is made that it lacks
"power to grant the particular relief prayed for," then a writ
of prohibition will not be granted; the petitioner must bring
2 Pub. Serv. Comm. v. New York & Queens Gas Co., 103 Misc. 703, 170
N. Y. Supp. 1009 (New York County, 1918); Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Brooklyn
Heights R. R. Co., 105 Misc. 254, 172 N. Y. Supp. 790 (Kings County, 1918);
Pub. Serv. Comm. v. International Ry. Co., 106 Misc. 364, 174 N. Y. Supp.
708 (Albany County, 1919). See Pub. Serv. Comm. v. New York & Queens
County Ry. Co., 170 App. Div. 580, 156 N. Y. Supp. 323 (2nd Dept. 1915).
- Sec. 56, Sec. 73, Sec. 86, Sec. 102.
2Bronx Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 190 App. Div. 13, 180

N. Y. Supp. 38, 47 (1st Dept. 1919).

'People v. Dempsey, 224 N. Y. 140, 120 N. E. 145 (1918).
-'People v. Whitridge (No. 1), 144 App. Div. 486, 129 N. Y. Supp. 295
(1st Dept. 1911), aff'd without opinion, 204 N. Y. 646, 97 N. E. 1112 (1912).

Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Fox, 99 Misc. 43, 163 N. Y. Supp. 420 (Albany

County, 1917).
'Matter of Quinby v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 223 N. Y. 244, 119 N. E. 433
(1918); re-argument denied, 227 N. Y. 601, 125 N. E. 922 (1919); see also
Matter of Evens v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 246 N. Y. 224, 158 N. E. 310 (1927).

52
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certiorari.30 If the Commission erroneously asserts lack of
power to act, certiorari is the remedy by which the aggrieved
31
party can compel action.
If the Commission has exceeded its jurisdiction in making an order, that order is void, and may therefore be attacked
collaterally. 32 But if the order was within the jurisdiction of
the Commission, and the objection is to the manner in which
the power was exercised, the order may be attacked only
33
directly, not collaterally.
The method of direct attack provided in the Civil Practice Act is by application to the Supreme Court for an order
or writ of certiorari to the Commission, requiring it to sub34
mit the controversy to the Appellate Division for review.
This writ may be brought by the utility affected by the
order, 35 or by the unsuccessful complainant,3 6 or by a third
party whose interests have been prejudiced by the determination.37 Certiorari lies only from a final order of the Como City of New York v. Richmond Light & R. R. Co., 183 N. Y. Supp.
922 (Sup. Ct. New York County, 1920), aff'd without opinion, 202 App. Div.
795, 194 N. Y. Supp. 924 (1st Dept. 1922). See Matter of Quinby, srupra,
note 30, at 254. And see Hopper v. Willcox, 155 App. 213, 140 N. Y. Supp.
277, 283 (1st Dept. 1913), leave to appeal denied, 140 N. Y. Supp. 423 (1913).
" Matter of International Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 226 N. Y. 474, 124
N. E. 123 (1919); motion for re-argument denied, 227 N. Y. 669, 126 N. E.
922 (1919); United Traction Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 219 App. Div. 95, 219
N. Y. Supp. 421 (3rd Dept. 1927).
"-Park Abbott Realty Co. v. Iroquois Natural Gas Co., 102 Misc.
266, 168 N. Y. Supp. 673 (Erie County, 1918, aff'd in memorandum, 187 App.
Div. 922, 174 N. Y. Supp. 914 (4th Dept. 1919); People v. Monarch, 193 App.
Div. 707, 185 N. Y. Supp. 5 (2nd Dept. 1920), leave to appeal denied, 185 N. Y.
Supp. 947 (1920).
' People ex reL. Karl v. United Traction Co., 145 App. Div. 645, 130
N. Y. Supp. 477 (3rd Dept. 1911) ; City of New York v. N. Y. Edison Co., 196
App. Div. 644, 188 N. Y. Supp. 262 (1st Dept. 1921); Town of North
Hempstead v. Public Service Corp., 199 App. Div. 189, 191 N. Y. Supp. 394
(2nd Dept. 1921). See City of Rochester v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 198
App. Div. 973, 190 N. Y. Supp. 229 (3rd Dept. 1921); Stanley v. Jay St.
Connecting R. R., 182 App. Div. 399, 169 N. Y. Supp. 530 (App. Div. 2nd
Dept. 1918), aff'd without opinion, 227 N. Y. 639 (1919).
' C. P. A., Secs. 1284 and 1287. Certiorari is the only proceeding which
goes directly to the Appellate Division from the Commission. (This is analogous to the review of the orders of the Federal Trade Commission by certiorari
All other proceedings,-injunction by or
to the Circuit Courts of Appeal.)
against the Commission or a utility or individual, mandamus by the Commission
and prohibition against the Commission, are commenced in the Supreme Court.
"People ex rel. Joline v. Willcox, 194 N. Y. 383, 87 N. E. 517 (1909);
and see opinion below, 129 App. Div. 267, 113 N. Y. Supp. 861 (1st Dept. 1908)..
"See, e. g., People ex rel. Village of South Glens Falls v. Pub. Serv.
Comm., 225 N. Y. 216, 121 N. E. 777 (1919).
" See cases cited, supra, note 9.

REVIEW OF THE P. S. COMMISSION

mission. 38 The order is not final until the Commission has
refused an application for a re-hearing thereon, 39 but the
application for a re-hearing must be made within the time
limit during
which certiorari may be brought,-which is four
40
months.
Since certiorari is a discretionary writ, the court is not
obliged to grant it if the complainant simply presents questions of law,-he must adduce facts which tend to prove the
existence of one of the reasons given in the Practice Act 41 for

vacating the order. 42 Certiorari will not be granted if the
objections existed at the time of hearing before the Commission and were not made there.4 3 So if the utility against
whom an order is made fails to appeal from the order and
then engages in a practice similar to the one prohibited, the
court will be quick to sense an attempt to reach the forbidden
end by a roundabout means, and will hold the company to be
barred from doing this because of its acquiescence in the
previous order. 44 Furthermore, if any new evidence has
arisen, the utility should go before the Commission and have

3 People ex rel. New York Central & Hudson River R. R. Co. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm., 195 N. Y. 157, 88 N. E. 261 (1909) ; People ex rel. Pennsylvania
Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 181 App. Div. 147, 168 N. Y. Supp. 59 (3rd
Dept. 1917). See In re Town Board of Royalton, 138 App. Div. 412, 122
N. Y. Supp. 844 (4th Dept 1910)
-oMatter of N. Y. Central R. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 238 N. Y.
132, 144 N. E. 365 (1924).
40City of Buffalo v. Buffalo Gas Co., 82 Misc. 304, 143 N. Y. Supp. 716
(Erie County, 1913). See C. P. A., Sec. 1288.
'These are found in C. P. A. Sec. 1304, discussed in People ex rel. New
York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, infra, note 52.
People ex rel. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 101
Misc. 10, 166 N. Y. Supp. 825 (New York County, 1917).
,OIn re Pub. Serv. Comm. In re New York Central R. R. Co., 177 App.
Div. 444, 164 N. Y. Supp. 310 (1st Dept. 1917), aff'd without opinion, 222
N. Y. 541, 118 N. E. 1070 (1917).
dt People ex rel. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 160
App. Div. 144, 145 N. Y. Supp. 545 (3rd Dept. 1914). In this case, the Western
had been transmitting telegrams for the Postal to points where the latter had
no offices. The Western made an additional charge for the words indicating
the point of origin on the Postal system. The Commission ordered this
practice stopped, and the Western did not appeal, but then began to charge
the Postal for the words indicating the point of transfer from the Postal to
the Western systems, the use of these words being necessary for the Western's
accounting system. The court held that this was an attempt by the Western
to do indirectly what it had been prohibited from doing by the order.
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it reconsider the determination in the light of this new
evidence, before coming to the courts.4 5
After the Appellate Division has remitted the matter to
the Commission for a new or modified determination, the
parties must await such determination before they can carry
the case to the Court of Appeals. 46 But if the Appellate
Division directs what determination shall be entered, then
the matter may be immediately appealed to the higher
court.4 7 In any case, timely objections not taken before
the Appellate
Division cannot be raised in the Court of
48
Appeals.
The 'Supreme Court which grants the writ of certiorari
may, in its discretion, stay the execution of the Commission's
order pending the decision in the Appellate Division, 49 but
if the order is one fixing a rate, it may not be stayed except
upon notice and after hearing.8
When the case comes up before the Appellate Division
for review, the Commission must submit all the evidence
which it had considered, even though taken in ex parte proceedings, so that the court can have before it all the facts
which induced the Commission to reach its result.5 1 The
scope of review allowed to the court has been best described
by Judge Cuddeback.52
"It was assumed perhaps by the legislature that
the members of the public service commissions would
acquire special knowledge of the matters intrusted to
" It re Buffalo Frontier Terminal R. R. Co., 131 App. Div. 503, 115 N. Y.
Supp. 483 (4th Dept. 1909) ; People ex rel. United Traction Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm., 167 App. Div. 498, 153 N. Y. Supp. 542 (3rd Dept. 1915).
"People ex rel. Long Acre Electric Light & Power Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm., 199 N. Y. 254, 92 N. E. 629 (1910).
' People ex rel. South Shore Traction Co. v. Willcox, 196 N. Y. 212, 215,
89 N. E. 459 (1909).
"People ex rel. New York Central & Hudson River R. R. Co. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm., 208 N. Y. 589, 102 N. E. 1111 (1913).
"In re Iroquois Natural Gas Co., 176 N. Y. Supp. 474 (Sup. Ct., Albany
County, 1919); C. P. A., Sec. 1295.
Sec. 23 (2). See In re People's Gas & Elec. Co., 122 Misc. 285, 202
N. Y. Supp. 700 (Albany County, 1923).
People ex rel. Joline v. Willcox, 198 N. Y. 433, 91 N. E. 1102 (1910).
See People ex rel. New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 219 N. Y.
84, 88 et seq., 113 N. E. 795 (1916) ; aff'd, 245 U. S. 345, 38 Sup. Ct. 122 (1917).
The provision governing this practice is found in C. P. A., Sec. 1304. See also
People ex rel. New York Central & Hudson River R. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm., 195 N. Y. 157, 88 N. E. 261 (1909).
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them by experience and study, and that when the plan
of their creation was fully developed they, would
prove efficient instrumentalities for dealing with the
complex problems presented by the activities of these
great corporations. It was not intended that the courts
should interfere with the commissions or review their
determinations further than is necessary to keep them
within the law and protect the constitutional rights of
the corporations over which they were given control * * *
"It is urged that * * * the court may set aside
the determination of the commission as against the
weight of the evidence regarding it the same as the
verdict of a jury.
"* * * The review authorized does not substitute
the judgment of the * * * court for that of the [administrative body] upon the evidence or the merits,
but inquires into jurisdiction of the subject-matter,
the exercise of authority in relation to the subjectmatter according to law, the violating of any rule of
law to the prejudice of the relator and the like. * * *
"The court at the Appellate Division substituted
its own judgment for that of the public service commission in determining that the latter's order was unreasonable. This decision, if allowed to stand, will
seriously hamper the commissions in the discharge of
their duties, and go far towards defeating the efforts
of the legislature to establish agencies to regulate the
great public service corporations."
Certain points of procedure are peculiarly associated
with rate regulation, and are therefore discussed in the next
section.
III.
RATE REGULATION.
A.

Rates Fixed by Statute.

As the law stood before 1921, the Commission's jurisdiction over rates charged by common carriers, railroad and
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street railway corporations, was given by Sec. 49 (1) in the
following language:
"Whenever [the] commission shall be of opinion
* * * that the rates, etc., are unreasonable * * * or
that the maximum rates, etc. * * * are insufficient to
yield reasonable compensation for the services rendered, * * * the commission shall * * * determine the
just and reasonable rates, etc., to be thereafter observed and in force as the maximum, notwithstanding
that a higher rate, etc., has been heretofore authorized
by statute."
The jurisdiction over the rates charged by gas and electric corporations was given in somewhat different language,
and as the courts have interpreted the statute, this has led to
an important difference in result. The provisions in regard
to these utilities are found in Sec. 66 (5) and Sec. 72. Before
1921, the former read:
"Whenever the commission shall be of opinion
* that the rates, etc., are * * * unreasonable * * *,
the commission shall determine and prescribe the just
and reasonable rates, etc., thereafter to be in force
* * * notwithstanding that a higher rate, etc., has heretofore been authorized by statute."
* *

And Sec. 72 read:
"The commission within lawful limits may, by
order, fix the maximum price of gas or electricity not
exceeding that fixed by statute. * * * The price fixed
by the commission under this section or under Sec.
66 (5) shall be the maximum price to be charged."
An examination of the cases which defined the Commission's powers under the above sections offers an interesting
laboratory study of "the nature of the judicial process."
It was easy to decide that the Commission had power to
reduce rates fixed by a special legislative act of incorpora-
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tion 1 or by a municipal license. 2 There was no provision in
the above sections against the reduction of statutory rates,
and these grants were held not to come within the constitutional protection against impairment of contract obligations.
It was a little harder to decide that the Commission
could increase the rates on mileage books when the books3
were required and the rates were fixed by the Railroad Law.
The Ulster & Delaware case 4 reached this conclusion upon
the ground that the Commission's power over this form of reduced rate was derived from parts of the statute other than
Sec. 49 (1), 5 and that these parts did not contain the words
"notwithstanding that a higher rate, etc., has been heretofore
authorized by statute." This seems a tortuous construction of
the Public Service Commissions Law. The history of the legislation tends to confirm the contention of the minority, that
these other parts of the statute gave to the Commission power
only to require new forms of reduced rate tickets,-as commutation, excursion, school, family, and children's half-fare
tickets, but did not affect the Commission's jurisdiction to fix
rates in regard to tickets which were already in existence.
Therefore, they argued, the rates in this case came under the
provisions of Sec. 49 (1), which allows the Commission only
to reduce but not to increasea statutory rate. The majority
opinion refused to undertake any interpretation of 'Sec. 49
(1), because they said it had no application to this situation.6
The Quinby case 7 was the first case to state categorically that the Commission had power to increaserates of fare
'People ex rel. Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 140 App.
Div. 839, 125 N. Y. Supp. 1000 (3rd Dept. 1910).
2 People ex rel. Bridge Operating Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 153 App. Div.
129, 138 N. Y. Supp. 434 (1st Dept. 1912).
'Laws of 1890, c. 565, as amended by Laws of 1910, c. 481 (Consol. Laws,
c. 49). Sec. 60 deals with these mileage books.
'People ex rel. Ulster & Delaware R. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 171
App. Div. 607, 156 N. Y. Supp. 1065 (3rd Dept. 1916), (three to two decision),
aff'd on opinion below, 218 N. Y. 643, 112 N. E. 1071 (1916) (four to three
decision).
'Sec. 33 (4) and the second paragraph of Sec. 49 (1), both as amended
by Laws of 1911, c. 546. In speaking of Sec. 49 (1), I include only the first
paragraph of that section.
. See 156 N. Y. Supp. at 1069.
7Matter of Quinby v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 223 N. Y. 244, 119 N. E. 433
(1918), re-argument denied, 227 N. Y. 601, 124 N. E. 790 (1919).
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on railroads and street railroads, even though these rates had
been fixed by statute'
The court repeated that this point had not been passed
upon in the Ulster & Delaware case, and went on to say: I
"The words 'notwithstanding that a higher rate,
etc., has heretofore been authorized by statute' are not
entirely apt, but the section, read as a whole, is susceptible of no other natural interpretation than that
the legislature has, for greater certainty, expressly
included in its general delegation of powers, the power
of the commission to reduce a maximum rate fixed by
the legislature. , The purpose of the legislation was to
provide for the regulation of statutory fares by a board
which may be expected to pass equitably upon conflicting claims with its single purpose the common
good even where a maximum rate had been fixed by
the legislature."
This may be a desirable result to reach as a question of
policy. But it is submitted, with all due respect to the court
which seemed to be unanimous on this point,' 0 that this is
doing violence to the language of the statute. Mr. Presiding
Justice Kellogg, in his dissent in the Ulster & Delaware case,
also found this clause "notwithstanding that a higher rate,
etc., has heretofore been authorized by statute" to be inconsistent with the words in the earlier part of the section,
"whenever the commission * * shall be of opinion * * * that
the maximum rates, etc. * * * are insufficient." But he
pointed out that when the bill was introduced, this last clause
had read "notwithstanding that another or different rate,
etc.," and that the Legislature had substituted the word
"higher" for the words "another or different" for the very
purpose, as the debates showed, of preventing the Commission from increasing any statutory rate.'"
The talk of the Quinby case did not apply, however, to
Sec. 72, where we find no language regarding the insufficiency
' The statute in this case was the amendment to the charter of the city
of Rochester, Laws of 1915, c. 359.
' See 223 N. Y. at 258.
10 See note 42, infra.
1 See 156 N. Y. Supp. at 1072.
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of the maximum rates, and where it is specifically provided
that the rate may not exceed that fixed by statute. In the
Municipal Gas case, 2 the court decided that because of this
proviso in Sec. 72, the Commission did not have power to
increase a statutory gas rate. The court intimated that this
power might exist if only Sec. 66 (5) were involved, since
that was like Sec. 49 (1), considered in the Quinby case,
but said that the two sections relating to gas rates must be
considered as interdependent, and that the restrictive clause
of Sec. 72 could not be nullified by grounding the proceeding
on Sec. 66 (5).
B.

Rates Fixed by Franchiseor Contract.

A different problem arises when the rate which the
utility is allowed to charge has been fixed as a part of the
consent given by a municipality to the use of its streets.
Street railway companies are required to obtain these consents by Art. 3, Sec. 18 of the New York Constitution. It is
settled that stipulations as to rates of fare, etc., which are
imposed by the municipalities as a condition of granting
these consents or franchises, are binding on the street car
companies by ordinary principles of contract law. 1 3 But the
questions that have been the source of much controversy in
the New York courts are:
(1) May the Legislature, in the exercise of its
police power, abrogate these conditions?
(2) Assuming that the Legislature has this
power, had it delegated that power to the Public
Service Commission?
This problem arose for the first time in 1916, in the
North Shore Traction case.' 4 Without a full or satisfactory
discussion, the Appellate Division held that the Public ServPeople ex rel. Municipal Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 224 N. Y. 156,
120 N. E. 132 (1918). In this case the gas rates for the city of Albany had
been established by Laws of 1907, c. 227.
'Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Westchester Street R. R. Co., 206 N. Y. 209, 99

N. E. 536 (1912).

" People ex rel. New York & North Shore Traction Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm., 175 App. Div. 869, 162 N. Y. Supp. 405 (3rd Dept. 1916).
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ice Commission had power to increase the rates fixed by these
franchises. The court relied largely on the case discussed
above which had allowed the Commission to reduce the fares
established by a municipal license. 15 But this is to overlook
the very significant difference between the terms of a permit
which is revocable at will by the municipality, 16 as contrasted with a condition which is part of the consideration
given to the municipality for binding itself by a franchise
contract.
This case was overruled in 1918 by the Quinby case, 17
which involved the street railway fares in the city of Rochester. These fares had been fixed both by franchise agreement
and by statute. We have already examined the court's remarks to the effect that the statute would not prevent the
Commission from increasing the fares. But the majority,
speaking through Judge Pound, held that the Commission
had no power to increase the rates above those fixed in the
franchise. The court expressly refused to consider, and left
open for future determination, the first question above, as to
whether the Legislature had the power to abrogate these
consents; the decision went emphatically on the ground that
whatever the powers of the Legislature might be in this connection, it was not clearly shown that the Legislature had
delegated any of these powers to the Commission.' 8 This construction was adopted on the ground that Sec. 49 (1) and
the other relevant sections 19 make mention only of rates of
fare established by statute, and did not purport in terms to
give the Commission power over fares established by
franchises.
Next in order came the South Glens Falls case 20 which
People ex tel. Bridge Operating Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 153 App.
Div. 129, 138 N. Y. Supp. 434 (1st Dept. 1912).
"See 138 N. Y. Supp. at 438.
'Matter of Quinby v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 223 N. Y. 244, 119 N. a_ 433
(1918), re-argument denied, 227 N. Y. 601, 125 N. E. 922 (1919). This does not
in terms overrule the North Shore Traction case, but it is cited as having that
effect in Village of Mamaroneck v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 208 App. Div. 330, 203
N. Y. Supp. 678, 684 (3rd Dept. 1924), aff'd without opinion, 238 N. Y. 588,
144 N. E. 903 (1924).
See 223 N. Y. at 263.
" Sec. 26 of the Public Service Commissions Law and Sec. 181 of the
Railroad Law.
People ex rel. Village of South Glens Falls v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 225
N. Y. 216, 121 N. E. 777 (1919).
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decided that the Commission had the power to increase gas
rates which had been fixed by the franchise agreements. In
the case of gas and electric corporations the municipal constreets is not required by the Constitution,
sents to using the
21
but by statute.
Judge Crane,.writing the prevailing opinion, first develops the argument that this franchise contract is one which
may be abrogated by the Legislature in the exercise of the
reserve police power which had remained with it after the
parcelling out of some rights and privileges to its political
subdivisions, the municipal corporations. He then finds that
the Legislature has delegated this power to the Public Service
Commission. This conclusion is a little hard to understand,
in view of the Quinby case decided only nine months before.
In that case, it will be remembered, the court said that since
the Legislature had empowered the Commission to change a
rate notwithstanding that it had been fixed by statute, but
had not made such an express extension of the Commission's
power to rates fixed by franchise, power to change the latter
rates would not be implied. Judge Crane concurred in the
following memorandum: 22
"I am of the opinion that the reserve police power
of the legislature has not been contracted away. I
concur in the above opinion insofar as it states that
the legislature has not in this instance given to the
public service commission the power of regulation."
Now Sec. 66 (5) has exactly the same language in this
connection as Sec. 49 (1),-both of them say only that rates
established by statute shall not be exempt from the Commission's power. If the power to alter franchise rates was
not given by Sec. 49 (1), as Judge Crane admitted, certainly
it could not have been given by Sec. 66 (5). The majority
opinion is not very clear in its discussion, but the argument
'Transportation Corporations Law. This was originally Laws of 1909,
c. 219, but was completely revised by Laws of 1926, c. 762, Sec. 1. The
sections requiring this consent were Sec. 61 (1) and (2) of the old law, and
Sec. 11 (1) and (3) of the new law.
The "municipal authorities" mentioned in the statute means the ordinary
governing body. Niagara & Erie Power Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 156 N. Y.
Supp. 879 (App. Div. 3rd Dept. 1916).
'See 223 N. Y. at 264.
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seems to be that the power can be found in Sec. 72, which
gives the Commission power to establish a rate "not exceeding that fixed by statute." The learned justice concludes
that this restriction is the only one upon a power which is
otherwise plenary, and since franchise rates do not fall
within this exception they are subject to the Commission's
general power of regulation.
This interpretation seems strained. As the court pointed
out in the Municipal Gas case, Sec. 66 (5) and Sec. 72 are
interdependent, and the language of either, which is designed
to impose an additional restriction, should not be construed
to expand the limits of the other. True, the Quinby case
does not hold that Sec. 66 (5) expressly denies to the Commission any power over franchise rates, but simply says that
the power is not clearly granted. But it is no easier to find
such a grant implied by the language of Sec. 72. The Commission was given power "within lawful limits" to fix the
price of gas; these lawful limits include the municipal
franchises, until the Legislature has made clear its intention
to abrogate those franchises. It seems fairly obvious that
the words "not exceeding that fixed by statute" were added,
not to mark out the sole exception to an otherwise unlimited
power, but rather to make it absolutely clear that in addition
to other limitations, including those of the municipal
franchises, the statutory maximum should not be exceeded.
This additional precaution was necessary because Sec. 66 (5)
might be interpreted, as Sec. 49 (1) was interpreted in the
Quinby case, to mean that the Commission could increase
the statutory rate. This argument was stressed by the dissenting judges, who contended that the instant case and the
Quinby case were indistinguishable on the question of the
Commission's power over franchise rates.
Neither can any distinction be drawn from the fact that
the requirement of consent in the Quinby case was part of the
Constitution, while it was only a statutory matter in the
present case. As the dissenting judges point out, this difference is important only as bearing on the first question,
whether the Legislature has power to abrogate the conditions, but doesn't help to show whether any power that exists
in the Legislature has been delegated.
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The only ground on which the Soutth Glens Falls case
can be supported is that taken by Judge McLaughlin in his
separate concurring opinion. This is, that the state has
never delegated to the municipalities its sovereign power to
regulate the rates of public service corporations. The statute
requiring the municipal consents to allow gas and electric
corporations to use the streets provides that those consents
may be given "under such reasonable regulations as
they [the municipal authorities] may prescribe." Judge
McLaughlin says that reasonable regulation does not include
the power to fix rates. Therefore the franchise rate was a
private contract between the municipality and the utility,
and like any other private contract (as we shall see below)
was subject to abrogation by the Legislature in its general
supervision. In other words, the Legislature had never delegated its rate-making power to the municipalities, but had
delegated all its power on this subject to the Commission
with the single exception in regard to the statutory maximum. Therefore, the argument runs, it is unnecessary to
find an express grant of power over these franchise rates, for
the Legislature didn't consider this subject important enough
expressly to place it, ex majore cautella, within the jurisdiction of the Commission.
From this point of view, the Quinby case is distinguishable in that the consent provision there was in the Constitution, and had been interpreted as giving the municipality
power to fix rates, so that the Legislature should have taken
some positive action with reference to that power.
Even so, the distinction seems rather strained, and Judge
McLaughlin himself did not seem to think much of it, as is
shown by his opinion in the NiagaraFalls case, discussed below. f think the result can be explained as being purely an
accident of the calendar. The Court of Appeals at this time
consisted of ten members, of whom only seven sat at any one
time. The South Glens Falls case was decided by a four to
three vote, and the three members who did not participate in
this case 23 had voted with the majority in the Quinby case,
and showed clearly by their subsequent opinions that they
'Judges

Cardozo, Pound, and Andrews.
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agreed with the result of that case; 24 so that a different composition of the court in the second case would have made it
more harmonious with the first. On the other hand, I think it
is equally true to say that six of the ten members at this time
did not like the doctrine of the Quinby case, 25-some of those
who had voted for it having changed their minds. Indeed, several of the judges tried in later cases to confine the Quinby decision to street railways in the city of Rochester on the ground
that the decision was based on the special statute involved, 2
in spite of the fact that Judge Pound had said very distinctly
in that case: 27 "Rates so fixed by special statute are still
subject to regulation by the public service commission." This
method of distinguishing away an undesirable case moved
Judge Cardozo to remark 2 "Such a reading of the opinion
[in the Quinby case] underrates the capacity of the members
of the court to give expression to their meaning."
Nevertheless, when the Quinby case was re-argued before
the court, eighteen months after the first decision, and the
contention was made that it had been overruled by the Glens
Falls case, the court unanimously reiterated its earlier decision, and again emphasized the distinction, in regard to
street railways between franchise rates, which could not
be
2
increased, and statutory rates, which could be increased
And the principle was again affirmed and applied in the
Niagara Falls case, 30 the court laying special emphasis on
2 See infra, note 42.

This point is developed infra, note 42.
This suggestion was first advanced by Judge McLaughlin in his special
concurring opinion in the South Glens Falls case. See 225 N. Y. at 228.
Judge McLaughlin also suggested that the Quinby decision may be explained
as being required by the language of Secs. 173 and 181 of the Railroad Law.
But he himself shows in a later opinion that Sec. 181 could not possibly be in
the way of any such exercise of power by the Commission. See 229 N. Y.
at 350. And Sec. 173 merely deals with certain details of administration in
connection with the granting of such consents in the future, and provides that
this provision shall not in any way affect the terms of certain existing franchises,
including the Rochester agreement among them. This section said nothing
about the rate of fare, but merely provided that there should be only one fare.
See Judge Cardozo's remarks on this subject, 229 N. Y. at 339.
See 223 N. Y. at 259.
In the NiagaraFalls case. See 229 N. Y. at 340.
n227 N. Y. 601, 125 N. E. 922 (1919).
' Matter of City of Niagara Falls v. Pub. Serv. Comm, 229 N. Y. 333,
128 N. E. 247 (1920).
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the fact that three successive legislatures since the Quinby
case had been asked to change the effect of that decision by
expressly giving to the Commission jurisdiction over franchise rates, but had refused to do so. Three judges dissented,
again trying to whittle down the Quinby case, in spite of its
recent re-affirmance. Judge McLaughlin, speaking for the
minority, tried to extend even to constitutional consents his
conception in the South Glens Falls case,-that the municipalities had never been given power, other than as private
individuals, to stipulate for rates of fare. He quotes the
South Shore Traction case 31 for the proposition that the
conditions imposed in these consents cannot interfere with
the regulatory power of the Public Service Commission; but
the consents in that case were given after the passage of the
Public Service Commission Law, and so come under the rule
of the City of New York case, discussed below. I think it
safe to reiterate that if a different group of seven had sat in
the Niagara Falls case, the Quinby case would have been
completely overruled.3 2
In 1920, then, the situation stood as follows:
1. In regard to gas and electric rates, the Commission
did not have power to increase those fixed by statute (Municipal Gas case), but did have power to increase those fixed by
franchise (South Glens Falls case).
2. In regard to street railway fares, the Commission did
have power to increase those fixed by statute, but did not
have power to increase those fixed by franchise. (Quinby
case.
There were certain situations, however, in which the
Quinby case did not apply, and the Commission did have
power to increase franchise rates.
First, the case of franchises which expressly reserved to
the Legislature the right to regulate the fares. That the
Commission did have jurisdiction to increase these rates was
'People ex -el. South Shore, Traction Co. v. Willcox, 196 N. Y. 212, 89
N. E."2See
459 (1909).
infra, note 42.
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decided by a unanimous court in the InternationalRy. case.3 3
This case goes on the ground suggested in Judge McLaughlin's opinion in the South Glens Falls case. Since it was so
clear that the Legislature had the power to fix the rates in a
situation like this,3 4 this power passed to the Commission by
virtue of its general grant of power to regulate rates. It
wasn't necessary to make an express statement of intention
here because there was no possibility of a constitutional difficulty, as there was in the Quinby case. Judge Cardozo thus
explained the Quinby decision: 3 5 "In default of 'clear and
definite language,' we followed the settled rule that 'a statute
must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only
the conclusion that is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts
upon that score.' "

Secondly, the City of New York case " decided that the
Commission had jurisdiction over the rates in franchises
granted after the passage of the Amendment of 1911 to the
Public Service Commission Law. 37 The court said that these
consents were understood to be granted subject to the regulatory powers of the Commission which were then known to
' Matter of International Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 226 N. Y. 474,
124 N. E. 123 (1919) ; motion for re-argument denied, 227 N. Y. 669, 126 N. E.
910 (1919). This case involved the Milburn agreement between the city and the
street railways of Buffalo. That part of the agreement which abolished transfer
charges did not reserve to the Legislature any power of modification, and this
part was specifically excepted from the jurisdiction of the Commission by Sec.

49 (6).
The principle of this case was followed in City of New York v. Richmond
Light & R. R. Co., 183 N. Y. Supp. 922 (Sup. Ct. New York County, 1920),
aff'd without opinion, 194 N. Y. Supp. 924 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1922), (case
involving both kinds of consents) ; O'Connor v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 114 Misc.
337, 186 N. Y. Supp. 390 (Schoharie County, 1921).
The principle applies likewise to franchises which incorporated the
provisions of Laws of 1884, c. 252, Sec. 13, or of Sec. 181 of the Railroad
Law, since the latter section expressly provides that all rates of fare fixed
therein or by the aforementioned statute of 1884 remain subject to regulation by
the Legislature. Evens v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 246 N. Y. 224, 158 N. E. 310
(1927), (West Side, Court Street & East End, and Binghamton Central
franchises) ; Fagal v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 131 Misc. 398, 227 N. Y. Supp. 18
(Albany County, 1928).
People ex rel. Cohoes Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 143 App. Div. 769,
128 N. Y. Supp. 384 (3rd Dept. 1911), aff'd without opinion, 202 N. Y. 547, 95
N. E. 1137 (1911). This case upheld a special act reducing a rate fixed in a
franchise which reserved to the Legislature the power of regulation.
' See 226 N. Y. at 482.

People ex rel. City of New York v. Nixon, 229 N. Y. 356, 128 N. E.
245 (1920).
'Laws of 1911, c.546.
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exist. The constitutional provision about consents meant
only that a municipality should not have a railway constructed upon its streets against its will. The Legislature
could validly prescribe and limit the conditions which municipalities might attach to franchises to be granted in the
future. A municipality could not be required to consent, but
if it did consent the franchise thus given incorporated by
reference all the regulations which the Legislature had prescribed in advance. One such regulation was the passage of
the Public Service Commission Law, which declared that the
Commission should have jurisdiction over all matters embraced in the consents. The difficulty in the Quinby case
was that the franchise had been granted prior to the passage
of the statute, and the Legislature had not clearly indicated
its intention to give the Commission power over such franchises, as it did express its intention with regard to future
consents like those involved in this case. The court intimated
that this principle would extend to any consents granted after
the passage of the original law in 1907,38 but it was not called
upon to decide that point, since the franchise in question had
been granted in 1912.
This question was settled by the Garrison case,3 9 a per
curiam opinion. This case also decided that the Quinby doctrine did not apply to consents granted before January 1,
1875, the date when Art. 3, Sec. 18 was incorporated into the
Constitution. Prior to that time this consent provision had
been only in the statute, and the per curiam opinion gives no
inkling of what difference that should make, unless this is to
be understood as 4a0 line of demarcation adopted by the South
Glens Falls case.
Finally, the Garrison case decided that the Quinby doctrine did not apply to franchises granted directly by the
Legislature, 41 or to franchises which had reserved to the
' Laws of 1907, c. 429.
"People ex rel. Garrison v. Nixon, 229 N. Y. 575, 128 N. E. 255 (1920),
motion for re-argument denied, 229 N. Y. 645, 129 N. E. 943 (1920) ; motion to
amend remittitur denied, 229 N. Y. 647, 129 N. E. 943 (1920).
"oThis is the explanation given in Evens v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 246 N. Y.
224, 158 N. E. 310 (1927) [Washington Street & State Asylum and City
Railway franchises].
"This was followed in Evens v. Pub. Serv. Comm., supra, note 40
(Binghamton & Port Dickinson franchise).
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Legislature the power to fix the fares. As to all franchises
the
not coming within the above exceptions, the doctrine 4of
2
Quinby case was re-affirmed, three judges dissenting.
"This is a convenient place to study the votes and opinions of the several
judges with a view to supporting the propositions advanced in the text, namely
(1) that a majority of the judges did not like the Quinby doctrine; (2) that
if another group of seven had sat in the South Glens Falls case, that would
have followed the Quinby case, at least on the doctrine of stare decisis; (3)
that if a different group of seven had sat in the Niagara Falls case, that would
have overruled the Quinby case, both because the judges didn't like it, and
because they thought it had been practically put in the corner by the South
Glens Falls case.
The ten members of the court at the time the Quinby case was decided
were Chief Judge Hiscock and Judges Chase, Collin, Cuddeback, Hogan,
Cardozo, Pound, 'McLaughlin, Crane, and Andrews.
Chief Judge Hiscock dissented in the Quinby case and concurred in the
South Glens Falls case. It is thus clear that he did not approve of the Quinby
case. He did not sit in the Niagara Falls case, and concurred in the Garrison
case. I suggest it as a possibility,-and only as that,-that Chief Judge
Hiscock, if he had sat in the Niagara Falls case, would have voted to overrule
the Quinby case;but not having had an opportunity to do this, he felt obliged
to concur in the Garrison case since the principle of the Quinby case had been
repeated in the Niagara Falls case. I venture this suggestion because of Chief
Judge Hiscock's vote in the two previous cases, and because of his dissent in
the subsequent Mamaroneck case. Of course the attitude of the dissenting
judges in the Mamaroneck case is only mildly persuasive, since there is no
opinion, and the judges may have gone on the ground that there was an interurban railway involved, but if that was the sole ground of the dissent, it seems
to me it would have been stated (see discussion of the case, infra).
Judge Chase did not sit in the Quinby case, and wrote the dissenting
opinion in the South Glens Falls case, but proceeded entirely upon the argument that the two cases were indistinguishable and therefore the Quinby case
ought to be followed as a matter of stare decisis. He-then wrote a dissenting
memorandum in the Niagara Falls case, contending that since the Quinby case
could not be distinguished from the South Glens Falls case, it should be considered as having been confined to the particular situation there involved. From
this, and from the fact that Judge Chase joined in'the dissent to the Garrison
decision, I think it clear that he was opposed to the Quinby doctrine, and that
his dissent in the South Glens Falls case is to be explained purely on the basis
of stare decisis, which is the ground he gives in his decision.
This is absolutely clear in the case of Judge Collin, who -dissented in the
Quinby case. He joined Judge Chase's "stare decisis" dissent in the South
Glens Falls case, but then concurred in Judge McLaughlin's dissent in the
Niagara Falls case-a dissent which also asserted that the Quinby doctrine
was to be narrowly confined to the street railways in Rochester.'
Judge McLaughlin was obviously opposed to the Quinby doctrine. He did
not sit in that case, but his attitude appears clearly from his special concurring
opinion in the South Glens Falls case, his dissenting opinion in the Niagara
Falls case, his concurrence in result only in the City of New York case, and
his dissent in the Garrison and Mamaroneck cases.
I think this is equally obvious in regard'to Judge Crane, although he voted
with the majority in the Quinby case. The opinion he wrote for the majority
in the South Glens Falls case has already been discussed'in the text. In every
subsequent opinion he showed that he disapproved of the Quinby case. Thus
he wrote the dissenting opinion in the Garrison case and joined in the dissent
to the Niagara Falls case, on the ground that the Qunby case had been very
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To return to the application of the Quinby doctrine. It
must be remembered that this principle extended only to
street railways, the consent to the construction of which was
required by Art. 3, See. 18 of the Constitution. So it did not
apply to a railroad company that had been organized under
the Railroad Law;
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nor to a street railway whose business

narrowly limited by the South Glens Falls case. He also concurred in the
result only in the City of New York case, and dissented in the Mamaroneck
case.

Judge Cuddeback, like Judge Crane, concurred in the Quinby decision, but
also concurred in the South Glens Falls case. He was not on the bench in the
subsequent cases (his place being taken by Judge Elkus) so we cannot be so
sure of his attitude as we can of Judge Crane's. But I think it is fair to say,
from the study we have made of the other judges who concurred in the South
Glens Falls case, that one who concurred in that decision certainly didn't favor
the Quinby doctrine.
Judges Pound, Cardozo, Andrews, and Hogan were obviously in favor of
the Quinby doctrine and opposed to the South Glens Falls case. Judge Pound
did not sit again until the Mamaroneck case, he concurred there. Though a
dissent in the Mamaroneck case does not necessarily indicate a disapproval of
the Quinby doctrine, as pointed out above, a concurrence in that case clearly
shows an approval of the Quinby doctrine, because it is an even more extreme
case.

Judge Cardozo wrote a special concurring opinion in the Niagara Falls
case, and concurred in the Garrison case (with a modification) and in the
Mainarmeck case. Judge Andrews concurred in the Niagara Falls and
Mainaroneck cases, but did not sit in the Garrison case.
Judge Hogan did not sit in the Quinby case, but showed himself to be one
of its strongest supporters by dissenting generally in the South Glens Falls
case, by his opinion for the majority in the Niagara Falls case, by his solitary
dissent in the City of New York case, and by his special concurrence in the
Garrison case.
To sum up: 1. We list, as having definitely expressed themselves against
the Quinby doctrine, five judges: The Chief Judge, and Judges Chase, Collin,
McLaughlin, and Crane (the latter in spite of the fact that he concurred in the
Quinby case). We add Judge Cuddeback as most probably also opposed to the
doctrine, in spite of his affirmative vote in the case itself. Only four judges
(Judges Hogan, Cardozo, Pound, and Andrews) can be said with certainty
to have favored the doctrine.
2. Only four judges favored the decision in the South Glens Falls case, but
those four happened to sit in that case, and so it was decided that way. These
four judges were Chief Judge Hiscock and Judges Cuddeback, McLaughlin,
and Crane. Two of the three dissenters (Judges Chase and Collin) disagreed
with the Quinby doctrine, but felt bound to follow it. The three who did not
sit (Judges Cardozo, Pound, and Andrews) would clearly have voted against
the decision.
3. In the NiagaraFalls case, we list five judges as surely in favor of the
decision: Judges Hogan, Cardozo, Andrews, Elkus, and Pound (the latter not
sitting in that case). Judges Chase, Collin, and McLaughlin dissented. As to
Chief Judge Hiscock and Judge Crane who did not sit, the former would
probably have voted against that decision and the latter would certainly have
done so.
'" People ex rel. New York, Westchester v. Boston Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm., 193 App. Div. 445, 183 N. Y. Supp. 473 (1st Dept. 1920), aff'd without
opinion, 230 N. Y. 604, 130 N. E. 911 (1921).
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was almost entirely interurban, the local business being
merely incidental. 4 4 That is because these utilities do not
require such an extensive use of the streets, and the consents
are demanded by statute 45 rather than by the Constitution,
4
so that the South Glens Falls case applies. "
Even allowing for these exceptions and those which
were applied in the Garrison case, the Quinby doctrine prevented the Commission from increasing the street railway
fares on many of the important urban lines. These companies must have made a strong fight before the Legislature, for
in 1921 that body amended Sec. 49 (1) so as to read: 47
"The commission shall determine the just and
reasonable rates, etc., to be thereafter observed and in
force as the maximum * * * notwithstanding that a
higher or lower rate, etc., has been heretofore prescribed by general or special statute, contract, grant,
franchise condition, consent or other agreement."
The Legislature had now delegated whatever power it
had. This made it necessary to answer our first question
which had been expressly left open by the Quinby case and
all the subsequent cases on this point, namely, whether the
Legislature could constitutionally abrogate these consents.
In re McAneny,"s a case in the Appellate Division, answered
this question in the affirmative in a dictum which went into
the question very fully. The court held that the judges of
the Court of Appeals had indicated that this would be their
answer to the question. An examination of the previous cases
shows this interpretation to be entirely justified, 4 9 and this
feeling is reinforced by the fact that when In re McAneny
came before the Court of Appeals 50 it was unanimously
affirmed. Three judges concurred specially in holding that
"Koehn v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 107 Misc. 151, 176 N. Y. Supp. 147 (Albany

County, 1919).
' Secs. 21 and 171 of the Railroad Law.
6
In Koehn v. Pub. Serv. Comm., supra, note 51, the consents had been
obtained in 1914, and the court gave this as one of its grounds of decision.
following the City of New York case. But the court laid great stress on the
other basis for their decision, in which they followed the South Glens Fallscase.
"zLaws of 1921, c. 134, Sec. 29.
s198 App. Div. 205, 190 N. Y. Supp. 92 (1st Dept. 1921).

See infra, note 51.
' Matter of McAneny v. Board of Estimate, 232 N. Y. 377, 134 N. E.
187 (1922).
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the particular part of the 1921 Amendment which was then
before the court (and which did not include Sec. 49 (1)), was
constitutional. But while they reserved judgment as to
other sections of the Amendment, they said nothing about
Sec. 49 (1). It would seem, therefore, that this dictum of
1
In re McAneny was accepted by the Court of Appeals.552
This dictum resulted in a square holding in In re Fleming
to the effect that this change of Sec. 49 (1) was constitutional. This amendment thus gave to the Commission a
jurisdiction that it had not had previously,--the power to
increase franchise rates on street railways.5 3
' A reference to note 42, supra, shows clearly that Chief Judge Hiscock
and Judges Chase, Collin, McLaughlin and Crane were of opinion that the
Legislature had this power, and that probably Judge Cuddeback was of the
same opinion. The entire court (except Judge Hogan, who dissented) practically admitted this in the City of New York case. For that case decided that
the Legislature could prevent the municipalities from writing these fare stipulations into future consents, despite the fact that these consents were required
by the Constitution. And as to past consents, Judge Andrews concurred in
that part of the dissent in the Niagara Falls case which stated that the Legislature had power to abrogate these part consents. Judge Cardozo in his special
concurring opinion (in which Judge Elkus concurred) intimated that he too
would be of that opinion, if the question were before the court for decision.
Judge Pound did not express himself at that time. Judge Hogan's dissent in
the City of New York case and his special concurrence in the Garrison case
would seem to indicate that he did not believe the Legislature had this power.
This computation of a total of eleven judges who sat during the period of
these important cases shows six (and probably Judge Cuddeback) as certainly
believing the Legislature to have the power; two judges indicating very strongly
that they subscribed to that view, though not called upon to express a positive
opinion; one who did not believe it; and one who had never said anything
on the subject. However Judge Hogan seems to have departed from that
position, if he had ever held it very strongly, by concurring specially in Matter
of McAneny (as did Judge Cardozo), and Judge Pound concurred generally
in that affirmance.
'2 117 Misc. 373, 191 N. Y. Supp. 586 (Albany County, 1921), appeal
dismissed, no record having been filed, 192 N. Y. Supp. 925 (App. Div. 3rd
Dept. 1922). The reasoning of this case, which attaches some weight to the
fact that the franchises were granted subsequent to 1890, is not very satisfactory, for this line of distinction does not square with the previous cases. But
its result is clearly to hold constitutional the 1921 Amendment to Sec. 49 (1).
' The village of Brownville had granted a franchise in 1890 to the Black
River Traction Co., conditioned upon certain maximum fares being observed.
The company applied to the Commission in 1919 for permission to increase its
fare and it was held that the Commission had no jurisdiction, in view of the
decision in the Quinby case. People ex rel. Village of Brownville v. Pub.
Serv. Comm., 198 App. Div. 391, 191 N. Y. Supp. 293 (3rd Dept. 1921).
The company renewed its application after 1921, and it was held that the
Commission then had the power, by virtue of the 1921 Amendment. Matter of
Village of Brownville v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 209 App. Div. 640, 205 N. Y.
Supp. 525 (3rd Dept. 1924), aff'd sub. norn. People ex rel. Village of Brownville v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 240 N. Y. 586, 148 N. E. 716 (1925), (unanimous
court, no opinion).
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Things now having been nicely settled from the point of

view of the lawyer and the street railway companies, the
Legislature turned around again in 1923 and restored Sec.
49 (1) almost but not quite to its original form. The last
clause now read: 54
"Notwithstanding that a higher rate, etc., has
been heretofore
statute."

authorized

by general or special

This shows an obvious legislative intention to reinstate
the Quinby doctrine, and so the Mamaroneck case 55decided
that the Commission had no power, after the 1923 Amendment,5 6 to increase rates fixed by franchise. But if the Commission had acted under the 1921 Amendment (and before
the 1923 Amendment) so as to increase franchise fares, such
action effectively disposed of this condition in the franchise.
Therefore the rate fixed by the Commission during its lease
of power to alter these rates could at any later time be increased or decreased by the Commission without regard to
what the franchise rate had been before the change. This
was decided by the United Traction case 57 and this interpre"Laws of 1923, c. 891.
Village of Mamaroneck v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 208 App. Div. 330, 203
N. Y. Supp. 678 (3rd Dept. 1924), aff'd without opinion, 238 N. Y. 588, 144
N. E. 903 (1924). The railway in this case was an interurban, but it did a large
local business. The court distinguished the case from the Koehn case, supra,
note 44 on the ground that the utility in the Koehn case was a railroad, and
was built on private property.
In the principal case, the company had complied with the consent rate in
the village itself, yet the court enforced that part of the consent which
prescribed the rates between the village and outside points, though these outside
points had agreed to the increase. Both courts were divided in opinion.
The application by the company to the Commission in the Mamaroneck
case was made before the enactment of the 1923 Amendment, but before the
Commission could act on the matter the statute had become effective and the
Supreme Court stayed further proceedings. Sec. 94 of the General Construction Law (Consol. Laws, c. 22) provides that the repeal of a statute shall not
affect any proceedings commenced before the repeal and pending at that time.
The court held this inapplicable to the present case on the ground that the
Commission's power was analogous to a revocable power of attorney, and
therefore that the Commission could not act after its power had been withdrawn.
"United Traction Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 219 N. Y. Supp. 421 (App.
Div. 3rd Dept. 1927). The case might go on the ground that all the old
consents in this case were consolidated in, and therefore abrogated by new
franchises; and the new franchises, being granted in 1912 and 1913, came under
the decision of the City of New York and Garrison cases. On this factual
interpretation of a new franchise as superseding the old ones, compare People
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tation seems correct in view of the fact that the Legislature
had expressly refused to repeal any of the orders issued
by the Commission pursuant to its power under the 1921
Amendment.
Considering the phraseology of the 1923 Amendment, I
should be willing to argue the point that the Commission does
not have power to increase statutory street railway fares, in
58
spite of the statement to the contrary in the Quinby case.
Several members of the court contended that the statute was
the basis of the decision in the Quinby case, and therefore
regard that as a square holding to the effect that the Commission has no power to increase these statutory rates. I
am unwilling to rest my position on that ground because that
does not seem to be a legitimate interpretation of the case. I
prefer to argue from the intention of the Legislature as I
think it fairly appears from the successive changes in the
law.
It will be remembered that the Commission was originally given power to alter rates "notwithstanding that a
higher rate, etc., has been heretofore authorized by statute."
Judge Pound said in the Quinby case that this was to be interpreted as if the statute had read "notwithstanding that a
higher or lower rate, etc." The Legislature put that form
of wording into the Law by the 1921 Amendment. By the
1923 Amendment, however, the section was again changed
so as to give the Commission power "notwithstanding that a
higher rate has been heretofore authorized by general or
special statute." In 1920 it might have been excusable to
argue that when the Legislature said "higher," they meant
"higher or lower," although, as pointed out above, the legislative history of the bill shows this to have been a mistaken
ex rel. Brooklyn City R. R. Co. v. Nixon, 193 App. Div. 746, 184 N. Y. Supp.
369 (1st Dept. 1920), aff'd without opinion, 230 N. Y. 614, 130 N. E. 915
(1921); Evens v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 246 N. Y. 224, 158 N. E. 310 (1927),
(Binghamton Central franchise); Fagal v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 131 Misc. 398,
227 N. Y. Supp. 18 (Albany County, 1928). But in spite of this distinguishing feature on which the court relied somewhat, they went pretty strongly on
the ground stated in the text.
I There is serious question in my mind as to whether this statement is more
than a dictum, since the case was disposed of on the ground that the franchises
prevented the Commission from increasing the rates. But the language of the
court in denying the motion for re-argument (227 N. Y. 601) would seem to
indicate that the talk about the statute did affect some rates. I don't think
the case can be called a positive authority for the proposition.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
interpretation. But surely when the Legislature had expressly adopted the meaning which had been attributed to
them, and had then intentionally gone back to the original
form of the statute, it would be doing violence to their language to construe their words as meaning something which
had been so explicitly negatived. And it cannot be said that
the Legislature simply restored the old section in haec verba,
without thinking of all the effects of repealing the 1921
Amendment, because the section still spoke of "rates fixed by
general or special statute" (the words "general or special"
having been added for the first time in 1921 and being retained in the 1923 Amendment). It thus appears that the
Legislature adopted one of the changes made in 1921, but
refused to continue the one we are now considering.
If this analysis is correct, the courts should now hold
that the Commission has no power to increase street railway
fares established by statute, even though they had previously
decided otherwise, for this is purely a matter of statutory
construction, and the Legislature has now changed the
statute. But the court would not even have to contend with
any square holdings against this point of view. The United
Traction case allowed the Commission to increase a statutory
rate,"9 but that order of the Commission, like the increase in
the franchise rate discussed above, was made while the 1921
Amendment was still in force. The remarks in the Quinby
case have already been considered. The Garrison case and
the recent Evens case 0ohold that rates fixed by legislative
franchises may be changed by the Commission. But legislative franchises fall in a different category from statutes.
However this may be, it is clear that the Commission
has absolutely no power to alter franchise rates in the case
of street railways.6 1
" The statute in question was Laws of 1905, c. 358, which was involved in
the decision of People ex rel. Cohoes Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 143 App.
Div. 769, 128 N. Y. Supp. 384 (1911) ; aff'd without opinion, 202 N. Y. 547, 95
N. E. 1137 (1911). See note 34, supra.
' Evens v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 246 N. Y. 224, 158 N. E. 310 (1927).
The case of Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Gilchrist, 16 F. (2nd)
912 (S. D. N. Y. 1928) is not discussed here, because there would be no
point in entering into that controversy. I disagree most completely with the
conclusions and the reasoning of the statutory court; my reasons for this are
apparent from the foregoing analysis of the state cases.
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The situation is altogether different with regard to gas
and electric rates. 'The 1921 Amendment covered these rates
also. Sec. 66 (5) was changed to read: 62
"The commission shall determine and prescribe in
the manner provided by and subject to the provisions
of Sec. 72 * * * the just and reasonable rates, etc.,
thereafter to be in force * * * notwithstanding that a
higher or lower rate, etc., has heretofore been prescribed by general or special statute, contract, grant,
franchise condition, consent or other agreement."
And Sec. 72 now read

63 :

"The commission may, by order, fix just and reasonable prices, etc. * * * notwithstanding that a higher
or lower price has been heretofore prescribed by general or special statute, contract, grant, franchise condition, consent or other agreement."
The intent of the Legislature was thus manifested to
make Sec. 66 (5) and Sec. 72 interdependent, to approve the
doctrine of the South Glens Falls case and to change the
doctrine of the Municipal Gas case. This part of the Public
Service Commission Law has not been changed, so that to-day
the Commission has power to reduce or increase all gas or
electric rates, whether previously fixed by franchise or
statute. The same applies to steam rates and telephone and
telegraph rates, which were amended in 1921 in conformity
with the general scheme, and which were not changed by the
1923 Amendment.6 4
It is clear that all contracts made between a utility and
its customers since the passage of the Public Service Commission Law are deemed to be subject to the provisions of
that Law, and therefore that rates set by the Commission
'

Laws of 1921, c. 134, Sec. 40.
'Ibid.,

Sec. 49.

"The provisions as to prices of steam are found in Sec. 80 (4) and Sec.
85, as amended by Laws of 1921, c. 134, Sec. 56 and Sec. 62, respectively.
Telephone and telegraph rates are treated of in Sec. 97, as amended by Laws
of 1921, c. 134, Sec. 66.
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abrogate any that have been fixed by such contract. 6

This

is an obviously necessary power, in order to prevent dis-

crimination.

It was further held, on the authority of the

South Glens Falls case, that even contracts made prior to

the passage of that Law were nevertheless subject to change
by the state, in its process of regulation under the general

police power. 6
But the Commission has no power over such contract
rates if these rates were made in consideration of the grant
of an easement 67 or a license.6 8 These two cases are pertinent in a consideration of the pending Interborough litigation.
C.

ProceduralMatters.

Every public service corporation is required to keep on
file with the Commission a schedule of its charges.6 9 Since
the purpose of this requirement is to prevent discrimination,
it applies even where the Commission cannot fix the rate,-as
when it has been enjoined from enforcing the statutory rate."0
These scheduled charges must be paid by the public until the
Commission has taken some action in the premises; 7 1 one
who claims to be injured by the rates charged must complain
2
7
to the Commission before he can come into the courts.

People ex rel. N. Y. Steam Co. v. Straus, 186 App. Div. 787, 174 N. Y.
Supp. 868 (1st Dept. 1919), aff'd without opinion, 226 N. Y. 704, 123 N. E. 884
(1919) ; Fitts v. Andrews, 192 App. Div. 160, 182 N. Y. Supp. 464 (1st Dept.
1920). This is the rule adopted by the U. S. Supreme Court. Union Dry
Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service Corporation, 248 U. S. 372, 39 Sup. Ct.
117 (1919).
' Clute v. Nassau & Suffolk Lighting Co., 118 Misc. 630, 195 N. Y. Supp.
84 (Nassau County, 1922) ; Niagara, Lockport & Ontario Power Co. v. Seneca
Iron & Steel Co., 128 Misc. 335, 219 N. Y. Supp. 418 (Erie County, 1926).
This also is the rule adopted by the U. S. Supreme Court. Louisville &
Nashville R. R. v. Motley, 219 U. S. 467, 31 Sup. Ct. 265 (1911).
Village of Long Beach v. Long Beach Power Co., 104 Misc. 337, 171
N. Y. Supp. 824 (Nassau County, 1918), (agreement made after 1907).
'Pavilion Natural Gac Co. v. Hurst, 123 Misc. 477, 205 N. Y. Supp. 847
(Wyoming County, 1924), (agreement made before 1907).
This is required of railroads and other carriers by Sec. 28, of gas and
electric corporations by Sec. 66 (12), of steam corporations by Sec. 80 (10),
of telephone and telegraph lines and corporations by Sec. 92 (1).
o Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Kings County Lighting Co., 105 Misc. 665, 173
N. Y. Supp. 789 (Kings County, 1919).
'Metzger v. New York State Rys., 168 App. Div. 187, 154 N. Y. Supp.
(4th Dept. 1915), aff'd without opinion, 226 N. Y. 590, 123 N. E. 883 (1919).
"Murray v. N. Y. Telephone Co., 170 App. Div. 17, 156 N. Y. Supp. 151
(4th Dept. 1915), aff'd without opinion, 226 N. Y. 590, 123 N. E. 883 (1919).
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The utility may increase rates on its own initiative by
filing a new schedule with the Commission and giving it publication for thirty days in advance. 73 In the case of railroads and other carriers the Commission could (since 1"914)74
suspend these new rates until after a hearing was held.
But until 1921, the Commission did not have such power of
suspension in regard to increases proposed by gas or electric
corporations, 7 5 steam corporations, or telephone and telegraph lines.7 6 This restriction of the Commission's power
over the utilities other than common carriers applied also if
the old rate which it was now proposed to supersede had
been fixed by a franchise given after the passage of the
Public Service Commission Law, 7 7-- this follows easily from
the reasoning in the City of New Yorlk case. But the courts
have gone further. They have held that even if the existing
rate had been established by a franchise granted before 1907,
the logical extension of the South Glens Falls doctrine prevented the Commission from interfering with the company if
the latter sought to increase such a rate in the aforementioned
statutory manner.7 8 This result, though reached by a unanimous court, seems questionable, but it is of little purpose to
argue the point since the 1921 Amendment gave the Commission the power to suspend the charges proposed by these
For the provisions in regard to gas or electric corporations and steam
corporations, see the sections cited supra, note 69. Sec. 29 is the provision in
regard to carriers, and Sec. 92 (2) covers the case of telephone and telegraph
lines.
' Laws of 1914, c. 240, Sec. 1.
Sec. 66 (12), applied in Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Iroquois Natural Gas Co.,
184 App. Div. 285, 171 N. Y. Supp. 379 (4th Dept. 1918), aff'd without
opinion, 226 N. Y. 580 (1919).
" Sec. 80 (10)
Sec. 66 (12).

and Sec. 92, respectively, were the same in this respect as

" Town of North Hempstead v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 231 N. Y. 447, 132
N. E. 144 (1921).
78
Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Pavilion Natural Gas Co., 232 N. Y. 146, 133 N. E.
427 (1921), overruling the following cases in the lower courts: Village of
Freeport v. Nassau & Suffolk Lighting Co., 111 Misc. 671, 181 N. Y. Supp.
830 (Nassau County, 1920); Village of Mt. Morris v. Pavilion Natural Gas
Co., 183 N. Y. Supp. 792 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cdunty, 1920), aff'd without
opinion, 187 N. Y. Supp. 957 (App. Div. 4th Dept. 1921) ; Village of Warsaw
v. Pavilion Natural Gas Co. (two cases), 196 App. Div. 918, 187 N. Y. Supp
350 (4th Dept. 1921), and 116 Misc. 435, 190 N. Y. Supp. 79 (Wyoming
County, 1921).
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utilities, 79 so that they have since been treated in the same
manner as the carriers.
The Commission has always been authorized by the
statute to allow these increases to be made by any utility
without requiring the 30 days' notice.8 0 And the courts held
that the Commission might, in its discretion, allow the increase to go into effect temporarily, while the hearing was
pending (upon taking proper security for a refund in the
event that the new rates were found unreasonable) .1 This
decision was enacted into the statute by the 1921 Amend82
ment.
On complaint or on its own motion, the Commission may
institute a hearing to decide on the reasonableness of an
existing rate, if it is sought to reduce that; or of a new rate,
if the utility has filed a proposed increase, as discussed
above. At any such hearing, the courts held that it was error
to put on the utility the burden of proving reasonable the existing or proposed rate,-the burden was rather on the complainant or the Commission to show the company's rate to be
unreasonable.8 3 This was changed to some extent by the Legislature in 1914. A provision was added that if a carrier sought
to increase the existing rate, it must sustain the burden of
84
showing that the new rate asked for is a reasonable one.
The 1921 Amendment completed the change, by adding the
requirement that the carrier bear the burden of establishing
the reasonableness of the existing rate when that is attacked,8 5 and extended this procedure (and that introduced
" Sec. 66 (12) was amended to this effect by Laws of 1921, c. 134, Sec. 42;
Sec. 80 (10) by ibid., Sec. 56; Sec. 92 by Laws of 1920, c. 957.
o See section's cited supra, note 73.
City of New York v. N. Y. Telephone Co., 115 Misc. 262, 189 N. Y.
Supp. 701 (New York County, 1921), aff'd without opinion, 236 N. Y. 615,
142 N. E. 306 (1923).
' Sec. 29, as amended by Laws of 1921, c. 134, Sec. 24; Sec. 66 (12) and
Sec. 72, as amended by ibid., Secs. 42 and 49, respectively; Sec. 80 (10) and
Sec. 85 as amended by ibid., Secs. 56 and 62, respectively; Sec. 92 and Sec. 97
as amended by ibid., Secs. 65 and 66, respectively.
People ex rel. New York Central & Hudson River R. R. Co. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm., 215 N. Y. 241, 109 N. E. 252 (1915); People ex rel. N. Y.
Telephone Co., 169 App. Div. 448, 154 N. Y. Supp. 1093 (3rd Dept. 1915).
Sometimes, however, the utility may have agreed to bear the burden of proof.
See People ex rel. Iroquois Natural Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. (1921), 194
App. Div. 578, 186 N. Y. Supp. 177 (3rd Dept. 1921).
s Sec. 29, as amended by Laws of 1914, c. 240, Sec. 1.
Sec. 29, as amended by Laws of 1921, c. 134, Sec. 24.
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by the 1914 Amendment) to the other utilities.8 6
At first the courts held that any determination by the
Commission in regard to rates was "judicial" in character,
and therefore subject to review in the courts by certiorari5 1
Subsequently the courts said that such a determination was
"legislative" in nature, and so on certiorari, the court would
undertake only a limited review. The court said it would
not substitute its own judgment on the facts, but would only
examine those facts to see whether there was "substantial
evidence to sustain the order" and no error of law,-if the
company alleges confiscation and desires a complete review
of facts as well as law, it should bring a bill for injunction.8"
It does not appear that this theoretical difference in approach has made any substantial difference in the results of
the cases.8 9 One important point, however, is that in the
court proceedings to review a rate determination by the Commission, the burden of proof is on the company to show that
the Commission's rates are unfair and inadequate,-at least
since the 1921 Amendment. °
The Commission has no jurisdiction to declare a ratefixing statute unconstitutional as confiscatory. 9 1 It is true
that in the WhMish 92 case the Commission had refused to
enforce Sec. 77 of the Railroad Law on the ground that it
was unconstitutional under the commerce clause of the federal Constitution, since Congress had "occupied the field" by
one of the amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act. That
determination of the Commission was upheld by the courts.
The distinction between the two cases is reasonable enough.
In the Whish case, the Commission was asked to enforce a
6,Sec. 66 (12) and Sec. 72 as amended by Laws of 1921, c. 134, Sec. 42 and
Sec. 49, respectively; Sec. 80 (10) and Sec. 85 as amended by ibid., Secs. 56
and 62, respectively; Sec. 92 and Sec. 97 as amended by ibid., Secs. 65 and 66,
respectively. Sec. 92 had previously been amended by Laws of 1920, c. 957, to
the same effect as Sec. 29 in note 89, supra.
People ex rel. Joline v. Willcox, 194 N. Y. 383, 87 N. E. 517 (1909).
' Pennsylvania
Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 211 App. Div. 253, 207
N. Y. Supp. 599 (3rd Dept. 1925).
But see ibid., 207 N. Y. Supp. at 612.
'People ex rel. Adirondack Power & Light Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm.,
200 App. Div. 268, 193 N. Y. Supp. 186 (3rd Dept. 1922).
"People ex rel. Municipal Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 224 N. Y. 156,
120 N. E. 132 (1918).
-Whish v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 205 App. Div. 756, 200 N. Y. Supp. 282
(3rd Dept. 1923), aff'd on opinion below, 240 N. Y. 677 (1925).
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statute that it considered unconstitutional; in the Municipal
Gas case, the Commission was asked to abrogate an allegedly
unconstitutional statute. When an administrative body is
confronted with such a choice, probably non-action is the

safest conduct, until a court shall pass on the matter.

It

would be interesting to see what the courts would decide in

a proceeding brought to compel the Commission to enforce a
statutory rate which the utility was not following, and which
the Commission believed confiscatory.
If the utility contends that the statutory rate is con-

fiscatory, its remedy is to go to the courts, which will grant an
injunction on the principle of Exa parte Young,9 3 if the en-

forcement of the rate threatens great injury.

4

In such an

action, the Public Service Commission is a proper party defendant in addition to the state and local officials, and the
county where the Commission is located is a proper venue
for the action."
If the Commission is enjoined from enforcing the statu-

tory rate, it cannot thereafter intervene in any legislation
in which an individual seeks to enjoin the utility from charging a higher rate.9 6 After the courts have declared the

statute unconstitutional,

7

the Commission is free to regulate

-209 U. S. 123 (1908).
People ex rel. Municipal Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 225 N. Y. 89,
121 N. E. 772 (1919); Bronx Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 108 Misc.
204, 178 N. Y. Supp. 218 (New York County, 1919), modified and affirmed,
195 App. Div. 931, 186 N. Y. Supp. 935 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1921). The
statutes in both these cases were subsequently declared unconstitutional. See
infra, note 97. Cf. Jamaica Gaslight Co. v. Nixon, 110 Misc. 500, 181 N. Y.
Supp. 623 (New York County, 1920), and 182 N. Y. Supp. 930 (App. Div.
1st Dept. 1920).
Brooklyn Borough Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 175 App. Div. 684, 161
N. Y. Supp. 169 (1st Dept. 1916), aff'd without opinion, 220 N. Y. 576 (1917).
In this case the bill for injunction was brought against the Attorney General
of the State who is located in Albany County; the District Attorney of Kings
County, and the Public Service Commission for the first district, which is
located in New York County. It was held that New York County was a
proper venue for the suit.
Duitz v. Kings County Lighting Co., 115 Misc. 14, 188 N. Y. Supp. 67
(Kings County, 1921). Cf. People ex rel. N. Y. Telephone Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm., 141 N. Y. Supp. 1018 (App. Div. 3rd Dept. 1913).
'Such statutes fixing the price of gas were declared unconstitutional in
Bronx Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 190 App. Div. 13, 180 N. Y.
Supp. 38 (1st Dept. 1919) ; Municipal Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 113 Misc.
748, 186 N. Y. Supp. 541 (Albany County, 1920) ; Kings County Lighting Co.
v. Newton, 202 App. Div. 473, 195 N. Y. Supp. 147 (1st Dept. 1922), aff'd
without opinion, 235 N. Y. 599 (1923). No attempt is made to discuss the
valuation principles laid down in these cases, since they have nothing to do with
action of the Commission.
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the rates since there is no statute to stand in the way, 98 and

the utility itself may raise its rate in the manner provided
by the Public Service Commission Law.99
D.

Valuation.

First we may consider a few special cases, which do not
raise general problems of valuation.

The Commission was upheld in allowing a gas company
to charge a flat service rate to each customer, regardless of
the quantity of gas used. 10 0 The court held that this was not
a rental charge for gas meters, which was prohibited by

statute. 01' The court reasoned that far from being discriminatory, this kind of charge was the most equitable way of
apportioning the costs of distribution.
The Commission was reversed in its attempt, acting

under Sec. 33 (4), to reduce the commutation rates from
New York City, on the New York, New Haven & Hartford

Railroad. 10 2 The court said first that the Commission was not
to substitute its judgment for that of the directors as to what
rate would yield the largest net return. 0 3 The court held further that in fixing these commutation rates the Commission

must consider, in addition to the actual out-of-pocket expense
of running each train, a fair allocation of interest, maintenance, and general expenses, and cost of upkeep of the tracks
and equipment. Finally the court decided that the New
Haven's rates should not be made to conform to those of other
' Morrell v. Brooklyn Borough Gas Co., 231 N. Y. 398, 132 N. E. 129
(1921). See Kings County Lighting Co. v. Newton, supra, note 18, 195 N. Y.
Supp. at 149.
Duitz v. Kings County Lighting Co., supra, note 17; Pub. Serv. Comm.
v. Brooklyn Borough Gas Co., 189 App. Div. 62, 178 N. Y. Supp. 93 (2nd
Dept. 1919). The provision of the statute is in Sec. 66 (12), referred to above.
20 City of Rochester v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 233 N. Y. 39, 134
N. E. 828 (1922).
101 Transportation Corporations Law, Sec. 66 of the old law, Sec. 16 of
the new law.
...
People ex rel. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. Co. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm., 159 App. Div. 531, 145 N. Y. Supp. 503 (3rd Dept. 1914), aff'd
on opinion below, 215 N. Y. 689, 109 N. E. 1089 (1915). This case held Sec.
33 (4) constitutional. The power of the Commission in these cases is derived
from Sec. 49 (1) of the Public Service Commission Law and Sec. 181 of the
Railroad Law.
1C3See People ex rel. New York Central & Hudson River R. R. Co. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm., 215 N. Y. 241, 253, 109 N. E. 252 (1915).
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railroads for the same distance. Since the New Haven had to
pay a unit charge per passenger to the New York Central for
the use of the latter's tracks and terminal facilities the passengers transported should pay at least a large share of this
charge-it is not like a gross expense, which may properly
be distributed over the entire system. The minority pointed
out that the use of the Grand Central Terminal gave to the
New Haven a position of prestige and power, and that therefore the expenses incident thereto, even though figured on a
per capita basis, should be borne by the total traffic. They
argued that the road admitted the force of this reasoning by
itself fixing the commutation rates at less than the aggregate
of the propulsion, trackage, and terminal charges.
Finally, we have a few transfer cases, which depend
facts. A list of these is appended in
upon their particular
10 4
the footnote.
Now as to general principles of valuation. First, if a
utility is engaged in more than one public calling, the rates
for each must show a fair return on the property invested in
that particular part of the business. If the rates on one
branch yield more than a fair profit, they must be reduced,
so as not to carry the burden of the non-remunerative
portion. 10 5
If the utility operates in another state as well, the
method of allocating the property devoted to New York con' People ex rel. Joline v. Willcox, 194 N. Y. 383, 87 N. E. 517 (1909)
sapra, note 92, was a case involving transfers, but the court passed only on the
procedural point, not on the merits.
Orders requiring issuance of transfers were affirmed in Willcox v. Richmond Light & Railroad Co., 142 App. Div. 44 128 N Y. Supp. 266 (2nd Dept.
1910), aff'd without opinion, 202 N. Y. 515 (1911) (franchise condition
required transfers); People ex rel. New York State Rys. v. Pub. Serv. Comm.,
167 App. Div. 279, 153 N. Y. Supp. 18 (3rd Dept. 1915), aff'd without opinion,
219 N. Y. 565 (1916) ; People ex rel. United Traction Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm.,
153 N. Y. Supp. 542 (App. Div. 3rd Dept. 1915). On the other hand, an order
of the Commission allowing an extra charge for transfers was upheld in City
of New York v. Nixon, 111 Misc. 224, 183 N. Y. Supp. 6 (New York
County, 1920).
110Municipal Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 225 N. Y. 89, 99, 121 N. E.
772 (1919). It is true that this case was discussing a statutory rate, but the
same principle would apply to a rate fixed by the Commission. For the method
of making the allocation, see People ex rel. People's Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm. (1925), 214 App. Div. 108, 211 N. Y. Supp. 662 (3rd Dept. 1925).
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sumers is set forth in the Pennsylvania Gas case, 0 6 where
the company did bhsiness in New York and in Pennsylvania.
The rate base is to be composed of the following:
1. Property used exclusively in the New York service
(including real property and fixtures situated in Pennsylvania, and materials, supplies, and capital requirements
needed in Pennsylvania in order to conduct the New York
business) ;
2. 'Of all the producing and distributing facilities for
both the New York and Pennsylvania business (but excluding that used solely in the Pennsylvania business) ,1o7 allocate
to New York the proportion that the New York consumption
bears to the total consumption.
As to the method of ascertaining the value of the property, Sec. 49 and Sec. 97 (applying to carriers and telegraph
and telephone companies respectively) directed the Commission to pay "due regard among other things to a reasonable
average return upon the value of the property actually used
in the public service and to the necessity of making reservation out of income for supplies and contingencies," while
Sec. 72 and Sec. 85 (applying to gas or electric, and to' steam
corporations respectively) used the words "capital actually
expended" instead of "property actually used." A subsequent
amendment applicable only to Sec. 49 (1) directs the Commission to give due regard, in addition to these other factors,
"to the estimated prospective earning capacity of such property at the rate of fare at the time fixed and existent."
It was settled that in evaluating the rate base of a gas
company under Sec. 66, the Commission could not simply
find the amount of "capital actually expended," but was required to find the "present value" of the property 0 8 But
'a Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 204 App. Div. 73, 198 N. Y.
Supp. 193 (3rd Dept. 1923) and 211 App. Div. 253, 207 N. Y. Supp. 599 (3rd
Dept. 1925). The power of the Commission to regulate the rates charged at
retail by such an interstate company was upheld in Chap. I, note 37, supra.
107Under these circumstances, it was held error for the Commission to take
into account, in connection with the return, the income from the company's
miscellaneous investments in Pennsylvania, which investments were not included
in the rate base.
" People ex rel. Iroquois Natural Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 194 App.
Div. 578, 186 N. Y. Supp. 177 (3rd Dept. 1921), motions denied, 186 N. Y.
Supp. 951.
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no rule was laid down as to how this "present value" could
be ascertained.
At first the court upheld the Commission in refusing to
apply the test of reproduction cost new, less depreciation. 10
After pointing out that such a test involved estimates
that are highly conjectural, and would result in constant fluctuations in rates as the costs of building varied, the court
said: 110
"Except where there has been an actual, considerable, and more than temporary increase in values
and in costs, the actual investment shown upon the
books of the corporation, fully, fairly, and honestly
kept, is a more certain and more true guide to that
'reasonable average return upon the capital actually
expended' which the statute contemplated, than is the
fluctuating uncertainty which attends upon the attempt to apply the reproduction cost, less depreciation, as the sole or the controlling element in determining fair value.

* * *

The reproduced plant would

probably cost twice as much as the existing plant,
although the existing plant is entirely adequate to the
service required, and

* * *

the reproduced plant would

probably be much more efficient, less expensive to
operate, and the saving in operating expenses would
largely account for or affect the extra cost."
The court admits, of course, that the fair present value
must include "actual appreciation in the value of the property acquired by the capital actually expended" (as distinct
from extensions and permanent improvements). But the
company cannot claim to have the reproduction cost of laying
mains, e. g., when the increased cost of excavation is caused
by the fact that the municipality has paved the streets."'
A method like this, if intelligently applied, would seem
to yield results that were fair to company and public alike.
Thus the court reversed the Commission's valuation when it
People
200 App. Div.
193 N.
' People

ex rel. Adirondack Power & Light Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm..
268, 193 N. Y. Supp. 186 (3rd Dept. 1922).
Y. Supp. at 190.
ex rel. Kings County Lighting Co. v. Willcox, 210 N. Y. 479,

494, 104 N. E. 911 (1914).
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was based on actual pre-war costs, and the value of the
112
property had increased greatly during and after the war.
This was all the stronger in the case of a carrier, where
reference must be had to the "value of the property actually
used" rather than of the "capital actually expended." The
court repeated that the Commission was not required to
adopt the test of reproduction cost new, but said the error
was in taking past value rather than present value. When
the Commission did, under certain circumstances, adopt the
test of reproduction cost new less depreciation, the court
approved it. 113
But then the United States Supreme Court handed down
the decisions in the Southwestern Telephone case 114 and
the Bluefield Waterworks case," 5 so that the courts of New
York were now obliged to say that "the dominating element
in fixing present value is reproduction cost, rather than historical cost, or actual cost, or prudent investment." "11 The
Commission was ordered to consider spot reproduction cost
at the time of valuation (1921), and not average reproduction cost for the ten-year period preceding." 7 While this
rule was reaffirmed in this term of the United States Supreme
Court by the Mcardle case,"18 it seems highly unsatisfac-

tory, but any adequate discussion of it is beyond the limits
of this paper.
Another vexing problem was the way in which the "depreciation reserve" should be treated. The wear and tear
of the plant and fixtures over a period of years is estimated
and rates are fixed so as to provide for a fair return on the
= People ex rel New York State Rys. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 202 App. Div.
576, 195 N. Y. Supp. 174 (3rd Dept. 1922).
"' Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 204 App. Div. 73, 198
N. Y. Supp. 193 (3rd Dept. 1923). The determination was reversed on
another ground, for which see note 121, infra.
u, Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm.,
262 U. S. 276 (1923).
' Bluefield Water Works Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 262 U. S. 679 (1923).
" See Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 211 App. Div. 253, 207
N. Y. Supp. 599, 607 (3rd Dept. 1925). Note the application of the doctrine
inthis case.
' Adirondack Power & Light Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 211 App. Div.
272, 207 N. Y. Supp. 284 (3rd Dept. 1925). The rule of spot reproduction
cost was laid down again in People ex rel. People's Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm., 214 App. Div. 108, 211 N. Y. Sup. 662 (3rd Dept. 1925).
"' McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400 (1926).
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capital or property, plus enough to accumulate this reserve
(to be applied to replacements and improvements as the
property deteriorates from use). Obviously this reserve is
not spent immediately, since it is apportioned in advance in
order to spread the burden equitably over the years during
which the machinery, etc., is being worn out, but before
actual replacement is necessary. The question arises whether
this "depreciation reserve," while it is as yet unspent and
is being carried on the books of the company, should be taken
into account in evaluating the rate base.
If the property is taken at assessed value, this reserve
account should not be taken into consideration. For in such
a case the appraiser values the property in its deteriorated
condition, and has thus made an actual allowance for depreciation. To deduct this reserve would be to compute the
depreciation twice."1 9 If, however, the property was taken
at book value, this reserve account should be deducted. For
the book value represents original cost, and in order to find
present value we must subtract the deterioration in use,and this is estimated by and represented in the depreciation
0

reserve. 12

But what if the original estimate of the wear and tear
was erroneous, so that, after making the proper replacements
during the period contemplated, the company has a surplus
left in this reserve fund, and then invests this surplus in new
additions or extensions? The court held that this investment
should not be considered as an addition to the book value of
the company's property, because it did not represent new
money contributed by the stockholders, but had been paid by
the consumers in the form of rates which are now shown by
experience to have been too high. 121 This seems clearly the
" Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 204 App. Div. 73, 198 N. Y.
Supp. 193, 195 (3rd Dept. 1923) and 211 App. Div. 253, 207 N. Y. Supp. 599

(3rd Dept. 1925).
People ex tel. Adirondack Power & Light Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm.,
200 App. Div. 268, 193 N. Y. Supp. 186 (3rd Dept. 1922).
'Ibid. In the Pennsylvania Gas cases, supra, note 119, the court had
refused to deduct the entire reserve fund, as pointed out in the text, because
the property had been taken at assessed, and not at book value. The Commission then put forward the claim that at least this excess in the fund should
be deducted from the assessed value, on the theory that the entire sum was a
trt~st fund for the benefit of the customers, and that whatever was not needed
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desirable rule, but the United States Supreme Court has
recently taken the opposite point of view, holding that the
company may keep as its own, and add to the rate base if
reinvested, any excessive past sums thus collected for depreciation. 2 2 The New York principle will therefore have to
yield.
In addition to the physical property, it is established by
the Kings County Lighting case 1 23 that the company is entitled to a return on its intangible property or "going value."
The decision by Judge Miller contains an excellent discussion
of the meaning, and the manner of applying this most elusive
principle of valuation. The plant in that case had been
valued at spot reproduction cost, less depreciation. The
court pointed out that this was to take account only of the
"bare bones" of the plant, and that the company was entitled
to be reimbursed for the proper and reasonable cost of building up the business,--of developing the most efficient method
of operation and of acquiring good will. The best way to
make this reimbursement is to add these development expenses to the capital structure (for rate-making purposes
only, not as a basis for security issues), rather than to allow
the company to recoup them out of very high rates at the
beginning, or to amortize them over a period of years.
Judge Miller said: 124
"I define 'going value' for rate purposes
to
be the amount equal to the deficiency of net earnings
below a fair return on the actual investment due solely
to the time and expenditures reasonably necessary
and proper to the development of the business and
for replacements should be credited as customers' capital invested'in the enterprise, and therefore should not be included in the rate base. The court
expressed its disapproval of this line of argument, but avoided a positive
decision on it by finding as a fact, in view of the substantial depletion of the
gas wells, that the amount of the reserve was not unreasonable.
(1 Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs v. N. Y. Telephone Co., 271 U. S. 23
(1926).
' People ex rel. Kings County Lighting Co. v. Willcox, 210 N. Y. 479,
104 N. E. 911 (1914). This principle was reiterated in People ex -el. People's
Gas & Electric Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 214 App. Div. 108, 211 N. Y. Supp.
662 (3rd Dept. 1925). But in the Pennsylva ia Gas cases, supra, note 119, the
Commission was not reversed for its failure to allow for going value on the
facts of that case.
" 210 N. Y. at 492 and 493.
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property to its present stage, and not comprised in the
valuation of the physical property * * *
"Obviously "the most satisfactory method" of appraising it "is to show the actual experience of the company, the original investment, its earnings from the
start, the time actually required and expenses incurred
in building up the business, all expenditures not reflected by the present condition of the physical property, the extent to which bad management or other
causes prevented or depleted earnings, and any other
facts bearing on the question, keeping in mind that the
ultimate fact to be determined is not the amount of the
expenditures, but the deficiency in the fair return to
the investors due to the causes under consideration."
The Commission subsequently adopted the rule of allowing 12% of the intangible assets for "going value," but
whether this is in lieu of the above test or is an added something allowed for good will does not appear. It was sustained by the court as applied to the facts of one case.' 20
The principles of law laid down in regard to what are
proper expenses and how they should be figured, are not of
very general importance. It was held that an allowance for
working capital of one-eighth of the operating expenses was
sufficient.

26

This working capital is necessary so that the

company can pay its way while it is waiting to be paid for
its services.
Another decision says that the federal income tax should
be allowed as an operating expense, but that in fixing the rate
of return, the Commission should take into consideration the
fact that this return will be net, since the deduction for taxation will already have been made.2 27 This is unobjectionable
if conscientiously applied, but it does seem a cumbersome
method, and might open the door to fraud in some cases. It
People ex rel. Adirondack Power & Light Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm.,
supra, note 120.
'Ibid. The court said it would have favored an allowance of one-sixth
of the operating expenses, so as to provide for two months instead of for a
month and a half, but it did not consider the difference important enough to
reverse for that reason.
'Pennsylvania Gas cases, supra, note 119. See the Adirondack Power
case, supra, note 120, 193 N. Y. Supp. at 194.
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would be much simpler mathematics to allow the utility a
fair rate of return compared with that received in other
industries, 1 28 and then compel it to pay the tax out of that
income, as the other industries do.
There is one indefensible decision holding that the Commission must make a fair allowance for necessary engineering, administrative, and legal expenses, when these services
had been rendered by the regular operating force of the company, and had therefore already been charged once to operating expenses. 1 29 It would puzzle any accountant to find
a reason for paying a company twice for doing the same
thing, simply because it was called by a different name each
time.
The Commission was confronted with a difficult problem when the prices of materials rose very markedly during
and after the war. The Commission argued rightly that they
could not figure these prices at their low levels, so as to
compel the utility to speculate against a rise in the market.
On the other hand, it was unfair to the public to fix a rate
on the basis of an inflated price condition which might be
only short-lived. The Commission found the best way out
of the difficulty is making a six-months rate, subject to revision according to fluctuations in the market, and this was
13 0
upheld by the court.
Where a gas-distributing company obtains its supply of
natural gas from a producing company with which it is connected by an interlocking directorate, the Commission may
inquire into the reasonableness of the price paid to the
producer.' 31
= The court has never laid down any set rule as to what is a fair return,
and specific cases are of no value in this connection, since they rest on their
own peculiar facts. Expressions concerning rate of return are found in the
Pemsylvania Gas cases, supra, note 119; in the Adirondack case, supra, note
117; and in the Adirondack case, sufpra, note 120.
" People ex rel. New York State Rys. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 202 App.
Div. 576, 195 N. Y. Supp. 174 (3rd Dept. 1922).
' People ex rel. Adirondack Power & Light Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm.,
.supra, note 116.
ul People ex rel. Iroquois Natural Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 194 App.
Div. 578, 186 N. Y. Supp. 177 (3rd Dept. 1921), motions denied, 186 N. Y.
Supp. 951.
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IV.
SUPERVISION OF SERVICE AND PUBLIC SAFETY.
A.

Certificates of Convenience and Necessity.

No utility is allowed to construct a plant or any additions thereto, nor to operate any facilities, unless it has been
granted a certificate of convenience and necessity by the
Public Service Commission. 1
Carriers had always been required to obtain such a
certificate from the board of railroad commissioners. But
the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission was narrower than that which the old board had. So it was held that
if the public convenience and necessity require the construction of a railroad along the general line indicated in the
company's charter, the Commission must issue the certificate,
-it cannot object to nor prescribe any particular route along
the designated line.2 Again, if a street railway is found necessary in the public interest, the Commission may not refuse its
certificate on the ground that it disapproves of the conditions3
attached to the consents given by the municipal authorities.
In one case, the Commission was reversed for granting a
certificate where the company had not complied with the requirement under the old Railroad Law of having subscribed
4
and in good faith paid up ten per centum of its capital stock.
:'Carriers are covered by Secs. 53 and 53a of the Public Service Commission
Law and Sec. 9 of the Railroad Law; busses and stage lines (since 1913) by
Sec. 25 of the old and Sec. 65 of the new Transportation Corporations Law;
gas or electric corporations, steam corporations, and telephone and telegraph
lines by Sec. 68, Sec. 81, and Sec. 99 (1), respectively of the Public Service
Commissions Law.
'In re Directors of Frontier Western R. R. Co., 155 App. Div. 57, 139
N. Y. Supp. 627 (4th Dept. 1913) leave to appeal denied, 141 N. Y. Supp.
1120 (1913); People ex rel. New York Central & Hudson River R. R. Co. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm., 227 N. Y. 248, 125 N. E. 438 (1919), re-argument denied,
228 N. Y. 553, 126 N. E. 728 (1920). See other stages of this litigation:
lit re Buffalo Frontier Terminal R. R. Co., 131 App. Div. 503, 115 N. Y. Supp.
483 (4th Dept. 1909); People ex rel. New York Central R. R. Co. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm., 193 App. Div. 322, 183 N. Y. Supp. 930 (3rd Dept. 1920).
'People ex rel. South Shore Traction Co. v. Willcox, 196 N. Y. 212,
89 N. E. 459 (1909).
'People ex rel. Bath & Hammondsport R. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 127
App. Div. 480, 112 N. Y. Supp. 133 (3rd Dept. 1908), modified and affirmed
194 N. Y. 543, 87 N. E. 1125 (1909).
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But in another case the Commission was allowed, by its certificate, retroactively to validate an existing structure which
had been erected in violation of law. Such a decision is open
to grave criticism, because it frequently gives an opportunity
to the utility to circumvent the plain purpose of the statute.
Bus and stage lines were brought under the jurisdiction
of the Commission in 1913.6 In 1915 the proviso was added
that any of these vehicles which carried passengers at a fare
of fifteen cents or less within city limits must secure the consent of the local authorities (given subject to whatever conditions they might prescribe) as a prerequisite to getting a
certificate from the Commission." This includes interurban
busses which do not carry any intra-urban passengers, so
long as they are operating within city limits, and receiving
or discharging interurban passengers; 8 and special jitneys
operated for the employees of a single factory.9 Both of these
additions to the statute apply to vehicles which had been
given municipal licenses prior to 1915.10 This requirement of consent from the municipality and a certificate from
the Commission for bus and stage lines is constitutional, the
difference in classification between jitneys on the one hand,
and taxicabs and similar vehicles on the other, being a reasonable one. 1
Unlike railroads and other carriers, gas and electric corporations were not required to get such certificates of convenience and necessity until the enactment of the Public
Service Commission Law in 1907. In its original form, See.
68 read as follows:
"No gas corporation or electrical corporation***
shall begin construction, or exercise any right or priviPeople v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 228 N. Y. 279, 127 N. E. 244 (1920).
Laws of 1913, c. 495, Sec. 1.
Sec. 26 of the old Transportation Corporation Law, added by Laws of
1915, c. 667, Sec. 1; now Sec. 66 of the new law.
Both the 1913 and the 1915 amendments were applied in Pub. Serv. Comm.
v. Mt. Vernon Taxicab Co., 101 Misc. 497, 168 N. Y. Supp. 83 (Rockland
County,
1917).
8
Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Hurtgan, 91 Misc. 432, 154 N. Y. Supp. 897
(Erie County, 1915).
'Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Fox, 96 Misc. 283, 160 N. Y. Supp. 59 (Albany
County, 1916).
"Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Booth, 170 App. Div. 590, 156 N. Y. Supp. 140
(3rd Dept. 1915).

n Ibid.
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lege under any franchise hereafter granted, or under
any franchise heretofore granted but not heretofore
actually exercised without first having obtained the
permission and approval of the * * * Commission."
The Court of Appeals interpreted these words according
to what it thought the policy of the statute was, and deeided their meaning to be that a corporation whose franchise
had been heretofore granted and had been heretofore actually
exercised, could exercise any further right or privilege under
the franchise without obtaining the Commission's approval;
except that no corporation, not even one which held a franchise actually exercised, could begin construction without
such permission.' 2 In other words, they construed the section to read as follows:
"No gas corporation or electrical corporation
shall begin construction * * * without first having obtained the permission and approval of the Commission. * * * No such corporation shall exercise any
right or privilege under any franchise hereafter
granted, or under any franchise heretofore granted
but not heretofore actually exercised * * * without
first having obtained the permission and approval of
the * * * Commission."2
If this was a judicial tour de force, the suggested phraseology was adopted by the Legislature in the codification of
1910, so the court seems to have read aright the legislative
mind, though it had been clumsily expressed.
While a person may generate electricity for his own use
without the Commission's approval, he must get permission
if he attempts to sell to others,'-this is so even if the plant
has been constructed on private property with the consent of
the owner thereof.14 The Commission should not grant a
People ex rel. N. Y. Edison Co. v. Willcox, 207 N. Y. 86, 100 N. E.
705 (1912).
'Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Rogers Co., 184 App. Div. 705, 172 N. Y. Supp.
498 (3rd Dept. 1918).
' People ex rel. Oneonta Light & Power Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 180 App.
Div. 32, 167 N. Y. Supp. 486 (3rd Dept. 1917), appeal dismissed, 224 N. Y.
624, 121 N. E. 885 (1918).
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certificate to a company which has started out as a private
corporation, and then, without dissolution, tries to amend its
charter so as to become a public service corporation.'15
B.

Orders Regarding Service.

The Commission has jurisdiction to compel a utility to
extend its service over all parts of its franchise area. This
method is much more efficacious than for the Attorney General to bring quo warranto. In the latter case, the entire
franchise will be forfeited; the public wants the franchise to
be used more, not to be abandoned altogether. The Commission's orders on this subject are only of specific interest in
their application to the facts in hand; these orders have generally been sustained by the courts as having been made in
the exercise of a proper discretion.1 6 But if the validity of
the franchise is in doubt because of non-user, the Commission should not make such an order until the question of 1the
existence of the franchise can be litigated in the courts.'
In addition to requiring service on franchise routes, the
Commission has power to compel extensions of the existing
facilities, so as to take care of the needs of new customers.'
In fact, the utility is under a duty to serve new customers,
and it cannot be relieved of this duty by the Commission. So
even though the supply had become inadequate to meet the
demand, it was held illegal for the Commission to issue an
People ex rel. Cayuga Power Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 226 N. Y.
527, 124 N. E. 105 (1919).
"People ex rel. New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 219 N. Y. 84,
113 N. E. 795 (1916), aff'd 245 U. S. 345 (1917) ; People ex rel. New York &
Queens County Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 173 App. Div. 826, 160 N. Y.
Supp. 91 (1st Dept. 1916); Pub. Serv. Comm. v. New York Rys. Co., 77 Misc.
487, 136 N. Y. Supp. 720 (New York County, 1912) ; People ex rel. Woodhaven
Gaslight Co. v. Nixon, 203 App. Div. 369, 196 N. Y. Supp. 623 (1st Dept. 1922),
opinion, 236 N. Y. 530, 142 N. E. 271 (1923).
aff'd1 without
• TPub. Serv. Comm. v. Richmond Light & Railroad Co., 108 Misc. 724, 163
N. Y. Supp. 64 (Richmond County, 1916), aff'd on opinion below, 188 App. Div.
970, 176 N. Y. Supp. 1918 (2nd Dept. 1919).
SThis power is given by Sec. 49 (2); Sec. 65 (1) and Sec. 66 (2) of
the Public Service Commissions Law and Sec. 62 (new Sec. 12) of the Transportation Corporations Law; Sec. 79 (1) and Sec. 80 (2) of the Public Service
Commissions Law; Sec. 97 (2) and Sec. 98 of the Public Service Commissions
Law.
These sections were applied in People ex rel. Pavilion Natural Gas Co. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm., 178 App. Div. 937, 164 N. Y. Supp. 866 (3rd Dept. 1917),
aff'd without opinion, 223 N. Y. 578, 119 N. E. 1075 (1918).
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order preferring existing over new customers, 19 or domestic

over industrial users.2" In exceptional circumstances, however, as where the supply is diminishing because of depletion
of the gas fields, a gas company is excused from this obligation to serve new customers, and the Commission cannot require it to do so.2

An amendment to the statute subse-

quently authorized the Commission to make a classification
between gas required for domestic and for industrial pur22
poses.
The Commission is often called upon to step in when a

utility will not serve a competitor, or will not serve him properly. Thus, it had to compel telephone and telegraph lines
to extend to their competitors the same privileges as were

enjoyed by other customers. 23 Again, in the electrical field,
it is a common arrangement for a manufacturing company to
generate power for its own use, and to sell the surplus to

private consumers at a low rate. Such a company is not
equipped, however, to give service in an emergency nor on
Sundays and odd hours. The large electric companies refused

to supply this so-called "break down service" to a competitor's customer, hoping in this way to compel the customer to
buy all his electricity from the large company. The Commission held that this "break down service" must be fur-

nished, and that the company can make an adjustment in
the rate if there is an additional cost because of the uncer" Park Abbott Realty Co. v. Iroquois Natural Gas Co., 102 Misc. 266,
168 N. Y. Supp. 673 (Erie County, 1918), aff'd in memorandum, 174 N. Y.
Supp. 914 (App. Div. 4th Dept. 1919) ; Burke v. Iroquois Natural Gas Co., 189
App. Div. 545, 179 N. Y. Supp. 230 (4th Dept. 1919), aff'd without opinion,
229 N. Y. 592 and 593, 129 N. E. 921 (1920).
People ex rel. Pavilion Natural Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 188 App.
Div. 36, 176 N. Y. Supp. 163 (3rd Dept. 1919), overruling dictum in the Burke
case, supra, note 19, 179 N. Y. Supp. at 232.
People ex rel. Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 196 App. Div.
514, 189 N. Y. Supp. 478 (3rd Dept. 1921). An important factor in this case, and
one which very likely controlled the decision, was that the company was a
foreign corporation and so was not subject to Sec. 62 (now Sec. 12) of the
Transportation Corporations Law.
' Laws of 1920, c. 540, Sec. 1, amending Sec. 66 (2).
People ex rel. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 230
N. Y. 95, 129 N. E. 220 (1920), motion to amend remittitur denied, 230 N. Y.
657, 130 N. E. 933. See People ex rel. N. Y. Telephone Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm., 157 App. Div. 156, 141 N. Y. Supp. 1018 (3rd Dept. 1913). This conclusion would seem to be clearly called for by Sec. 103 (now Sec. 28) of the
Transportation Corporations Law and Sec. 91 (3) of the Public Service
Commissions Law.
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tainty of this particular demand. 24 But obviously the company will not be required to extend this service to its competitor, if the latter desires it not for his own private use,
but in order to pass it on2 5to his customer, and thus to undersell the more effectively.
This lack of cotperation between competitors is most
injurious to the public in the case of railroads. In order to
remedy this situation, the Commission is given the power to
require proper facilities for the transfer of passengers and
freight at connecting points, subject of course to the provision that no carrier shall be required to allow another to use
his tracks or terminal facilities. 26 This exception precludes
the Commission from ordering an interchange at or near a
point where one road has industrial switches which are used
as a terminus for freight shipments.27 Furthermore, this
power of the Commission does not apply unless the railroads
intersect each other physically,-connection by means of an
abandoned spur track is not enough.28 The Commission is
also authorized to order a railroad to construct and operate,
on its own property, a switch connecting with a private sidetrack. 29 But the carrier can't be required to build on the
shipper's land,30 nor to operate a side-track on the latter's
property.3 1
The Commission has had occasion to make many service
orders for carriers (under Sec. 50), and its determinations
People ex rel. Perceval v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 163 App. Div. 705, 148
N. Y. Supp. 583 (1st Dept. 1914). This common law duty of the company is
expressed in Sec. 62 (now Sec. 12) of the Transportation Corporations Law

and Sec. 65 of the Public Service Commissions Law.
'People ex rel. N. Y. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 191 App. Div.
237, 181 N. Y. Supp. 259 (1st Dept. 1920), aff'd without opinion, 230 N. Y.
574, 130 N. E. 899 (1920).
Sec. 35 (see amendment made by Laws of 1920, c. 637, Sec. 1). Compare
Sec. 97 (3) and amendment made by Laws of 1919, c. 624.
'People ex rel. N. Y. Central R. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 177 App.
Div. 208, 163 N. Y. Supp. 777 (3rd Dept. 1917), aff'd without opinion, 223
N. Y. 582, 119 N. E_ 1075 (1918).
See People ex rel. N. Y. Central R R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 233
N. Y. 113, 135 N. E. 195 (1922).
'Sec. 27 (1) and (3), applied in People ex rel. N. Y. Central R. R. Co.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 173 App. Div. 407, 159 N. Y. Supp. 997 (3rd Dept.
1916), aff'd without opinion, 219 N. Y. 584, 114 N. E. 1078 (1916).
' People ex rel. Long Island R. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 170 App.
Div. 429, 156 N. Y. Supp. 198 (1st Dept. 1915).
' People ex rel. Erie R. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 176 App. Div. 28,
162 N. Y. Supp. 520 (3rd Dept. 1916), aff'd without opininon, 220 N. Y.
674, 116 N. E. 1066 (1917).
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in this connection have usually been approved. Thus, it may
require the construction of stations, 8 2 and decide on the nature of the structure 8 It can compel additional facilities
in the way of cars

34

and waiting-rooms.8

5

In the interests of

public safety, it may require power-brakes on street railways,8 6 and interlocking devices between intersecting railroads,-in the latter case apportioning the expense according to its own discretion. 7 But the Commission cannot require a railroad to elevate its bridge across the barge canal,
8
-that power is only in the Barge Canal Board.
One order about gas service got into the courts, and it
was held there that the Commission cannot require a gas
company to substitute at its own expense a block meter for a
89
prepayment meter.
C.

Grade Crossings.

The Commission gets its power over grade crossings from
the Railroad Law. Sec. 89 deals with new railroads across
streets, and Sec. 90 deals with new streets across railroads.
This last section originally applied only to the extension, not
to the widening of streets, but the courts construed this provision liberally, 40 and the statute was subsequently amended so
as to include widening of streets. 41
People ex rel Long Island R. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 173 App. Div.

780, 160 N. Y. Supp. 63 (1st Dept. 1916).
'In re Pub. Serv. Comm. In re Steinway Tunnel and Queensboro Plaza
Route, 157 App. Div. 211, 141 N. Y. Supp. 891 (2nd Dept. 1913), aff'd without
opinion, 211 N. Y. 550, 105 N. E. 1096 (1914).
People ex rel. United Traction Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 167 App. Div.
498, 153 N. Y. Supp. 542 (3rd Dept. 1915); Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Brooklyn
Heights R. R. Co., 105 Misc. 254, 172 N. Y. Supp. 790 (Kings County, 1918).
' Pub. Serv. Comm. v. New York & Queens County Ry. Co., 170 App. Div.
580, 156 N. Y. Supp. 323 (2nd Dept. 1915).
People ex rel. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 157
App. Div. 698, 142 N. Y. Supp. 942 (1st Dept. 1913). And see Sec. 49 (2).
6 People ex rel. International Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 180 App. Div.
773, 168 N. Y. Supp. 331 (3rd Dept. 1917) ; Pub. Serv. Comm. v. International
Ry. Co., 106 Misc. 364, 174 N. Y. Supp. 708 (Albany County, 1919).
People ex rel. Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 198 App.
Div. 239, 191 N. Y. Supp. 227 (3rd Dept. 1921).
"' Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Northern Union Gas Co., 168 App. Div. 731, 154
N. Y. Supp. 649 (1st Dept. 1915), aff'd without opinion, 217 N. Y. 607, 111
N. E. 1100 (1916). See Sec. 62 (now Sec. 12) of the Transportation Corporations Law, and Sec. 67 (5) of the Public Service Commissions Law.
"°In re Third Ave., 183 App. Div. 688, 170 N. Y. Supp. 470 (lst Dept
1918).
'Laws of 1914, c. 378.
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The Commission and the municipal authorities must determine the "necessity" of such an extension, but this requirement is satisfied by a showing of "reasonable convenience," which allows a wide margin of discretion. 42 If the
local municipal authorities have found such necessity, the
Commission can't go behind this finding. 43 But the Commission, and not the local authorities, must determine how the
crossing is to be made.44 Generally speaking, the Commission should be guided by considerations of safety, not of
expense. 45 See. 91 treats of alteration of existing crossings,
and is superior to any other section on this subject (if there
be a conflict). 46 Under this section, the Commission may
order a change in the line of the railroad, if that is necessary.4 7 Proceedings to eliminate existing grade crossings
4
may be instituted by the Commission on its own motion.
Sec. 94 provides the following method of distributing
the expense: 49

1. Whenever a new railroad is constructed across an
existing street, under Sec. 89, the railroad pays the entire
cost.
2. Whenever a new street is constructed across an existing railroad, under Sec. 90, the railroad and the municipality
each bears half the expense.
"In re Eighty-Fourth Street, 189 App. Div. 315, 178 N. Y. Supp. 617

(2nd Dept. 1919).
' In re Third Ave., supra, note 40; It re Village of Hobart, Appeal of
Ulster & Delaware R. R. Co., 204 App. Div. 595, 198 N. Y. Supp. 638 (3rd
Dept. 1923).
"It re Village of Hobart, supra, note 43; In re Town Board of Royalton,
138 App. Div. 412, 122 N. Y. Supp. 844 (4th Dept. 1910).
' It re Town Board of Royalton, supra, note 44. See dissenting opinion
in It re Village of Hobart, supra, note 43, 198 N. Y. Supp. at 642.
" Thus, it was held to take precedence over Sec. 22 in New Paltz, Highland
& Poughkeepsie Traction Co. v. Central New England Ry. Co., 84 Misc. 528,
147 N. Y. Supp. 624 (Erie County, 1914).
"In ire New York Central & Hudson River R. R. Co., Appeal of Village
of White Plains, 136 App. Div. 756, 121 N. Y. Supp. 528 (2nd Dept., 1910);
Danner v. New York & Harlem R. R. Co., 213 N. Y. 117, 106 N. E. 1029
(1914).
"Sec. 95. See In re Pub. Serv. Comm., In re N. Y. Central R. R. Co.,
177 App. Div. 444, 164 N. Y. Supp. 310 (1st Dept. 1917).
"As to the proper expenses in this connection, see People ex tel. Long
Island R. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 181 App. Div. 465, 168 N. Y. Supp. 832
(1st Dept. 1918), aff'd without opinion, 224 N. Y. 565, 120 N. E. 872 (1918).
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3. Whenever an existing grade crossing is eliminated,
under Sec. 91, the railroad bears half the expense and the
municipality and the state each pays one-quarter (except that
the state pays the entire half in the case of a state highway).
The municipality contemplated by the statute is the place
where the crossing is, not where the approaches areP0
All of the cases have come up under Sec. 91. If the
existing railroad structure was unlawful, 5 1 or if crossings
over private ways are eliminated, 52 the entire cost must be
borne by the railroad. And if the railroad desires the new
overhead or subway crossing to be long enough to permit the
construction of an additional track later, the railroad alone
must bear the cost of this additional span.5 3 Conversely, if
the span is longer than is required to cross the tracks, the
railroad does not bear any part of the cost'of this additional
length, 54 nor can the railroad be charged with the cost of
paving anything beyond the approaches. 5 And none of the
railroad's right of way can be taken, beyond what is reasonably necessary.56
V.
CONTROL OVER CORPORATE AFFAIRS.
A.

Inter-CorporateRelations.

The Public Service Commissions Law has certain provisions designed to prevent the control of these utility companies by stock corporations or any corporation other than one
People ex rel. Town of Scarsdale v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 220 N. Y. 1,
114 N. E. 1050 (1917).
"City of Mt. Vernon v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 119 Misc. 561, 196 N. Y.
Supp. 648 (Albany County, 1922).
%Matter of New York Central & Hudson River R. R. Co., 200 N. Y. 121,
93 N. E. 515 (1910).
" Matter of Erie R. R. Co. (Town of Hinsdale), 208 N. Y. 486, 102
N. E. 562 (1913) ; Matter of State Highway Comm. (Kirkwood Crossing), 201
App. Div. 94, 193 N. Y. Supp. 808 (3rd Dept. 1922). See Matter of New
York Central & Hudson River R. R. Co., supra, note 52.
" McAneny v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 238 N. Y. 122, 144 N. E. 362
(1924) ; In re East 238th Street, 215 App. Div. 152, 213 N. Y. Supp. 356 (1st
Dept. 1926), aff'd without opinion, 243 N. Y. 574, 154 N. E. 610 (1926).
1 Matter of State Highway Comm., suepra, note 53.
"Matter of State Comm. of Highways (Town of Ripley), 239 N. Y. 279,
146 N. E. 379 (1925).
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which is engaged in the same kind of public service, except
that an electrical corporation may buy and hold stock of any
carrier, and that a street railway corporation may buy and
hold stock in a gas or electric or a steam corporation. A corporation which is permitted thus to acquire the stock of a
utility must secure the consent of the Commission." Furthermore, the Commission must approve any transfer or lease of a
utility or of a franchise. 2 The consent or approval of the Commission in each of these cases may, of course, be given subject
to conditions.
B.

Issuance of Securities.

The statute 3 provides that any issue of securities for a
term longer than one year must be approved by the Commission. In granting such order, the Commission shall state
the purposes to which the proceeds are to be applied, and
must certify that those purposes are not chargeable to operating expenses nor to income. The following are specified
as the proper purposes:
(a) the acquisition of property;
(b) the construction, completion, extension, or
improvement of facilities;
(c) the improvement or maintenance of service;
(d) the reimbursement of moneys actually expended from income, or from sources other than security issues within the preceding five years, for any of
'Sec. 54 (2), Sec. 70, Sec. 83, Sec. 100. Sec. 70 was amended by Laws
of 1918, c. 420, so as to allow a stock corporation to buy and hold the stock of
a gas or electric corporation, with the consent of the Commission.
Sec. 70 was applied in New York-New Jersey Superpower Connecting
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 215 App. Div. 578, 214 N. Y. Supp. 294 (3rd
Dept. 1926). Sec. 54 (2) was applied in People ex rel. N. Y. Central R. R.
Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 193 App. Div. 322, 183 N. Y. Supp. 930 (3rd Dept.
1920).
'Sec. 54 (1) of the Public Service Commission Law and Sec. 148 of the
Railroad Law; Sec. 70, Sec. 83, and Sec. 99 (2) and (3) of the Public Service
Commission Law.
Sec. 54 (1) and Sec. 148, szpra, were applied in Westchester Fire Insur.
Co. v. Syracuse, Binghamton & New York R. R. Co., 192 App. Div. 463, 183
N. Y. Supp. 602 (1st Dept. 1920), aff'd without opinion, 233 N. Y. 600 (1922).
'Sec. 55, Sec. 69, Sec. 82, Sec. 101.
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the above purposes except maintenance of service, and
replacements;
(e) the discharge or lawful refunding of obligations.
The Commission must also state its opinion to be that
the money to be procured or the property or labor to be paid
for is or has been reasonably required for the purposes
specified in the order. No permission is required for the
issuance of securities for a term of less than a year, but if a
refunding issue is then desired for a longer term, the approval of the Commission must be had.
These sections of the statute are enforceable only by
proceedings for penalties against the companies violating
them. Even if the bonds are issued in violation of the law,
bona fide purchasers who take them are protected. 4 And
these sections do not apply to a change in the form of the
stock, as substituting stock of no par value for par value
stock; so long as no change is made in the capital structure,
the statute does not give the Commission jurisdiction. 5
The issuance of securities should not be allowed unless
the applicant has previously obtained the proper certificate
of convenience and necessity for construction and operation. 6 This is because an applicant without such certificate
does not have the present and absolute right to accomplish
the uses for which the securities are issued, and therefore is
unable to satisfy the statutory purposes. And the issue
should not be approved if the proceeds are to be used7 for
operating expenses, or for replacements and renewals.
A refunding issue should not be permitted if the original
obligation was incurred for running expenses, even though
at the time of that obligation it was lawful to issue longterm securities to take care of current expenses.8 On the
'Goldon v. Delaware & Eastern Ry. Co., 144 App. Div. 78, 128 N. Y.
Supp. 936 (1st Dept. 1911).
'People v. Liberty Light & Power Co., 121 Misc. 424, 201 N. Y. Supp.
302 (Albany County, 1923).
' People ex rel. N. Y. Edison Co. v. Willcox, 207 N. Y. 86, 100 N. E.
705 (1912).
People ex rel. Binghamton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Stevens, 203
N. Y. 7, 96 N. E. 114 (1911).
'People ex rel. Dry Dock, East Broadway & Battery R. R. Co. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm., 167 App. Div. 286, 153 N. Y. Supp. 344 (1st Dept. 1915).
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other hand, if a railroad's securities now sought to be refunded had been applied to the purchase of coal and trolley
properties, which was legal at the time (though now illegal),
the refunding issue must be authorized.9 The distinction is
that if the general purpose of the original issue was one not
approved by the present statute, it cannot be refunded, even
though it was lawful at the time of issue; but if the general
purpose satisfies the statute, then the fact that the method
or conduct of the transaction is prohibited now will not
prevent a refunding issue if such method was allowed at the
time of the transaction. A utility cannot float a security
issue on the strength of money taken from the depreciation
reserve for capital improvements,-for this reserve was allowed to the company as an additional expense to be applied
to that very purpose. 10
One very important limitation on the Commission's
power over security issues is that the Commission cannot
attach any conditions to its orders,-if the purpose is proper
and the other requirements are met, the issue must be approved; otherwise it must be rejected.1"
If the collateral offered to secure the loan is reasonably
satisfactory, the Commission cannot require another kind of
collateral which it finds preferable. These sections of the
statute were designed only to prevent the issuance of watered
stock; the courts have been very strict in restraining the
Commission from trying to substitute its judgment for the
judgment of the directors and stockholders. 2 The Commission may require carriers to help uniform system of accounts, 3 but this may not be used as a basis for giving any
orders as to how the carrier should spend his money, etc.1 4
The statute further provides that the capital stock of
a utility corporation formed by the merger or consolidation
'People ex rel. Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Stevens, 197 N. Y. 1, 90 N. E.
60 (1909).
" People ex rel. Kings County Lighting Co. v. Straus, 178 App. Div. 840,
166 N. Y. Supp. 196 (1st Dept. 1917).
People ex rel. Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Stevens, supra, note 9. See
People ex rel. Binghamton Light, etc., Co. v. Stevens, supra, note 7.
= See authorities cited in note 11, supra.
Sec. 52.
People ex rel. N. Y. Railways Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 223 N. Y. 373,
119 N. E. 848 (1918).
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of two or more other corporations shall not exceed the sum
of the capital stock of the old corporations (at par value)
plus any additional sums paid in cash. The Commission
understood this to be the outside limit, and by analogy re-

fused to allow a corporation which had been reorganized
under the provisions of the -StockCorporation Law 15 to issue

securities in excess of the actual physical value of the property, though less than the capital stock of the old corporation. The court reversed this determination, holding that
the Commission's interpretation would defeat the purposes

of the corporate

reorganization

provisions referred

to

above. 16 But this applied only if the sale is made in pursuance of such a reorganization plan,-it could not be involved by an ordinary purchaser at foreclosure sale.17 And
the statute was subsequently amended so as to provide that

even in reorganization proceedings, the amount of securities8
issued should not exceed the physical value of the property.'
LEON LEIGHTON.

New York City.
'Laws of 1909, c. 61, amended and revised by Laws of 1923, c. 787
(Consol. Laws, c. 59). The provisions were Secs. 9-12 of the old law, Secs.
96-99 of the new law.
' People ex rel. Third Ave. Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 203 N. Y. 299,
96 N. E. 1011 (1911).
'People ex tel. Westchester Street R. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 210
N. Y. 456, 104 N. E. 952 (1914).
' Sec. 55a, added by Laws of 1912, c. 289, Sec. 1; Sec. 69a, added by Laws
of 1913, c. 505, Sec. 3; Sec. 101a, added by Laws of 1912, c. 289, Sec. 3.

